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# THE CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF SEPTEMBER 4, 1964

## Part I

### AN ANALYSIS

by **FEDERICO G. GIL**

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Professor, Department of Political Science  
University of North Carolina  
Chapel Hill, North Carolina

and

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INSTITUTE FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

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# 1. Introduction\*

Chile has experienced three presidential elections in the twentieth century that can be considered as turning points in the country's political history. The first was the election in 1920 of Arturo Alessandri (father of Jorge Alessandri, president during the period 1958-1964), who headed the reformist "liberal Alliance." The second was the contest in 1938 in which Pedro Aguirre Cerda and the "Popular Front" became the choice of the Chilean voters. The last took place on September 4, 1964. The 1964 election was, essentially, a contest between two reformers (the third candidate got only 4.95 percent of the vote); one was a Christian Democrat who espoused what he termed a "Revolution in Liberty," and the other a Socialist backed by the Chilean leftist parties, including the Communists, who called for a thoroughgoing reorganization of the economic and social structures of Chile. The victor, by an overwhelming margin, was the former, Eduardo Frei Montalva, and the vanquished candidate was Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens, a physician whose championing of reform had led him to be nominated for president on three occasions. What were the elements from which Frei's victory was fashioned? What will be the problems he faces as president? What does his victory mean for the future of Chile? These are but three of the questions that this study of Chile's 1964 presidential election will attempt to answer.

Before treating the 1964 election, it would be helpful to present a brief outline of the Chilean governmental structure to give the reader a general idea of what was at stake in this contest.

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## 2. The Chief Executive in the Governmental System

The Chilean president is elected for six years and may not stand for immediate re-election.<sup>1</sup> Only two presidents in this century have been re-elected after intervening terms (Arturo Alessandri, in 1920-1925 and 1932-1938; and Carlos Ibáñez, in 1927-1931 and 1952-1958). Direct election to the presidency occurs only when a candidate receives an absolute majority of the votes cast in a presidential election.<sup>2</sup> If no candidate receives such a majority, election of the president becomes a responsibility of the Congress. Meeting in joint session and voting individually by secret ballot, the senators and deputies choose between the two candidates who received the largest number of popular votes.<sup>3</sup> In no case on record has the Congress chosen other than the leading vote-getter in the presidential election. The fact remains, however, that a president so elected owes his investiture in part to the Congress—a dependency that has often affected executive-legislative relations.

Nevertheless, the chief executive possesses a considerable reservoir of political power.<sup>4</sup> In a scheme of administration that is highly centralized, he has, as would be expected, abundant authority in making appointments. He names the members of his cabinet, all executive officials, diplomats, *intendentes* (chief administrators of major geographic divisions), and governors (chief administrators of minor geographic divisions), and the *alcaldes* (mayors) of the major cities. These officers serve at the discretion of the president. In addition to this considerable patronage power, the president can initiate legislation and veto bills passed by the Congress (his veto may, however, be overridden by two-thirds vote of both houses). Only the president can initiate budgetary laws, which the Congress may accept, reduce, or reject, but may not amend or increase. The Chilean chief executive has the sole responsibility for collecting public revenue, carrying on foreign relations, and appointing the higher judges (from a list submitted by the judicial branch). In the event of foreign aggression, or in the case of internal disturbances, he may declare a state of siege in all or any part of Chile when the Congress is not in session. If the state of siege has not expired by the opening of the next Congress, the executive act must gain the approval of both houses of that body; and if the Congress is in session, then it, rather than the president, has the right to declare a state of siege.

It should be noted that a considerable amount of important legislation is proclaimed by presidential decree rather than by the process of congressional

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<sup>1</sup> *The Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile* (adopted September 18, 1925), Chapter V, article 62. (Hereinafter cited as *Constitution*.)

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter V, article 63.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter V, articles 64 and 65.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter V, article 72; this article sets forth in some detail seventeen different categories of powers.



enactment, and that the president is able to decree expenditures not authorized by law in special cases.<sup>5</sup> These special expenditures may not exceed 2 percent of the national budget of the current year, and the president must obtain the signatures of all his cabinet members in order to make these allocations. If there is an unconstitutional authorization of these expenditures, the appropriate minister of state (cabinet officer) may be held personally responsible for the funds and may be impeached by Congress. The president can also call the Congress into special session to consider proposals offered only by him.

A major portion of the laws passed by the Congress allow for a considerable amount of executive discretion, both in supplying the details and in administering the laws. In the formation of public policy in Chile, there is a stumbling block for the president—the existence of semi-independent agencies that administer special programs of the government. The president may appoint a majority of the administrative boards governing these “institutionally decentralized services” (*Servicios Institucionalmente Descentralizados*), but the major interest groups affected by the policies of the particular agency are often given representation. The participation of such groups creates a rather serious problem in implementing the policies that affect their interests.

The agrarian reform law, approved in October, 1962, provides a good example of this type of difficulty. In the *Corporación de Reforma Agraria* (Corporation of Agrarian Reform—CORA), representation is granted to the National Agricultural Society, the regional societies, and the *parceleros* (those to whom land is given under the agrarian reform). There is little doubt that the major power within CORA lies with the directors appointed by the president, but it is also evident that the presence of the representatives of great *fundo* owners of the central valley on the board of directors of this unit hinders those attempting to implement a genuine reform.

Although there is no constitutional provision establishing collective ministerial responsibility, previous presidents have had to walk softly in dealing with the Congress.<sup>6</sup> A contributing factor has been the persistent multi-party system, which has been aptly compared to that of the French Third and Fourth Republics. The necessity to create a supporting bloc within the Congress has led presidents into a pattern of shifting alliances in their dealings with the legislative branch. During the presidential term of Ibáñez (1952-1958) no less than 135 different men served as cabinet ministers. President Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964) had better luck in this matter, but congressional opposition stymied many of the measures he proposed.

The position of the comptroller general (*Contraloría General*) is unique to the Chilean political system.<sup>7</sup> This office, created by the Constitution of 1925, has evolved into a major restraining factor on the power of the execu-

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter V, article 72, paragraph 10.

<sup>6</sup> See Federico G. Gil, *Genesis and Modernization of Political Parties in Chile* (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1962).

<sup>7</sup> *Constitution*, Chapter III, article 21. The role of this important office in the Chilean political system has yet to be subjected to a systematic scholarly examination.



tive branch of government. As an autonomous rule-adjudication institution, the comptroller's office possesses the power to disallow presidential decrees that in the judgment of the *Contraloría* are either illegal or unconstitutional.<sup>8</sup> The president can issue a decree of insistence that overrides the ruling of the comptroller general, but this decree must be signed by all ministers of state (cabinet officers). In this case, the comptroller general then presents all of the information to the Congress, which in turn may act against individual ministers who signed the decree of insistence, if that body agrees with the comptroller general that the decree authorized is in violation of the Chilean constitution. An action of this sort by the Congress is rare, but the political cost of the issuance of a decree of insistence can be considerable. Opposition parties can lose little by attacking the executive and demanding impeachment proceedings against particular ministers. Since the names of only ten deputies are needed for charges to be considered by the Chamber of Deputies, to resort to such dilatory tactics is very tempting to the opposition.

The court system of Chile has a long history of autonomy and political independence. Even the right of the president to appoint judges is restricted,<sup>9</sup> for he must appoint ministers of the Supreme Court from a list of five candidates submitted by the court itself. Two of the names appearing on the list are always those of the senior ministers (judges) of the court of appeals. This system of recruitment extends downward in the court system: thus, the senior scholastic judge (*jueces de letras*, a rank just below that of a minister of courts) appears on the list of three nominees submitted to the president for promotion to the rank of minister judge. The higher judges have unlimited tenure and may remain in office on good behavior. The constitution provides for the establishment of autonomous administrative tribunals to pass upon arbitrary acts against individuals on the part of administrative bodies, but as yet no steps have been taken to establish such tribunals by statute. This is but one instance in which a constitutional provision has not yet been implemented by the passage of the necessary legislation.<sup>10</sup>

The courts of Chile do not have the right of judicial review in the broad sense that exists in the United States. The Chilean Supreme Court's right of interpreting the constitution has limited practical effects, since the decision that a statute or executive act is unconstitutional as applied in a specific case does not constitute its total nullification.<sup>11</sup> However, as pointed out above, the *Contraloría General* exercises a type of judicial review by his ability to dis-

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<sup>8</sup> An interesting account of the men who have occupied this important office is given in "La Contraloría General de la República," *El Mercurio*, March 9, 1958.

<sup>9</sup> *Constitution*, Chapter V, article 72, paragraph 4; and Chapter VII, article 83.

<sup>10</sup> For example, Chapter IX, articles 94 through 100, provides for the setting up of provincial assemblies to handle administrative and legislative problems on a provincial basis. As yet, these have never been created.

<sup>11</sup> Under a constitutional provision (Chapter VII, article 86), the Supreme Court does have the right to declare as inapplicable in individual cases legal provisions contrary to the Constitution. However, there is no power to declare acts of the executive or laws of Congress null and void. Thus, an individual may obtain relief for an unconstitutional law in his own case, but the law remains on the books until Congress itself decides that the law does not conform to the Constitution, at which time it passes another bill rescinding the law.



allow presidential decrees that exceed the limitations on constitutional expenditures.

The performance of the legislative function is shared primarily by the Congress and the executive branch of the Chilean government.<sup>12</sup> While the Congress has the primary constitutional responsibility for legislation, in practice it more often acts as an opponent to presidential proposals than as an initiator of legislation. The autonomy and independence of the Congress have constituted an important weapon against vigorous presidential action on numerous questions in recent years. Still, the Chilean Congress must be judged to be the weaker partner in the policy-making process, for its power is essentially negative. Although the Congress possesses a considerable arsenal of dilatory weapons, there is little likelihood that this body could provide policy leadership in a direction with which the president disagreed.

The Chilean Congress consists of two houses, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.<sup>13</sup> The 45 senators are elected for eight-year terms with staggered elections so that the composition of the Senate changes every four years. This body holds certain powers of approval with respect to executive appointment of higher governmental officials who are not of cabinet rank. The Chamber of Deputies consists of 147 members, and the entire membership is renewed every four years. The Congress has the power of impeachment of the president and the higher executive officers, and in these instances the Chamber offers the indictment while the Senate tries the case. This is not a negligible power and it is often used for political purposes as a means of legislative control over the executive. As recently as 1957, cabinet ministers were removed in this fashion.

Constitutionally, the president is a participant in the legislative process. As has been observed, he may introduce bills and propose the annual budget, which the Congress may accept, reduce, or reject, but which it cannot amend or increase. Furthermore, if the budget is not acted upon in four months, it automatically goes into effect. Beyond this, the president's ministers can participate in debate on bills in which the executive is interested, although they cannot vote.<sup>14</sup> The office of a minister is constitutionally incompatible with that of a deputy or senator.<sup>15</sup>

Another weakness exists in the relative position of the Congress vis-à-vis the executive in the policy process. The Congress does not have the technical staff to provide expertise on the variety of subjects with which it must deal, whereas the executive does command such expert advice. Thus, when a complicated subject comes up for debate, the executive often has the advantage, in that even the act of drafting a bill to cope with the matter may be beyond the capacities of an individual legislator acting alone. It is partly for this

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<sup>12</sup> *Constitution*, Chapter IV, articles 45 through 55.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter IV, articles 37 through 42, deals with the organization of the two houses of Congress; the powers of Congress are contained in Chapter IV, articles 43 and 44.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter IV, article 78.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter IV, article 29.



reason that the vast majority of bills that go through the Chilean Congress leave much of the legal detail to be supplied by the executive branch. Through the employment of this power of decree, the president or, more precisely, the *técnicos* and administrators play an important part in the legislative process.

Congress has protected itself over the years against executive encroachment by, among other things, refusing to pass legislation making the presidential and congressional elections concomitant. Thus, the congressional elections frequently represent a coalescence of public opinion that differs from the issues raised in the presidential elections. The continued existence of a multi-party system that produces legislative politics reminiscent of that in France during the Third and Fourth Republics is due in part to the use of a modified D'Hondt system of proportional representation.<sup>16</sup> The electoral reforms of 1958 and 1962 eliminated, however, the plethora of "*callampa*" (mushroom) parties that existed primarily to advance the opportunistic interests of their leaders.<sup>17</sup> Under the former system, there were no fewer than eleven "serious" national parties and a number of smaller ones. At present, there are fewer parties, and those that exist are generally grouped into essentially three broad coalitions representing the Left, the Center, and the Right. Nevertheless, the continuing multi-party system still fosters legislative irresponsibility and opportunism.

It may be said in general that there are no basic, irremediable faults in the political system that might impede the forward movement of the nation. When a country has developed a system in which there is respect for legality, a quite genuine popular and democratic representation, a president whose powers are legally limited, a judiciary not subject to undue pressure, and a Congress that goes about its business normally and without restraints, a high degree of political maturity is evident. To be sure, modifications in the governmental structure may be required in the near future in order to achieve a just social order, but the important fact is that Chile already possesses enlightened legal and political institutions that put it well ahead of many Latin American nations on the path of political development. These institutions should, without basic changes, prove to be adaptable to the requirements, within democratic channels, of a social revolution designed to cure Chile's economic and social ills.

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<sup>16</sup> For a description of the operation of the D'Hondt system in Chile see: *Chile: Election Factbook* (Washington, D. C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1963), pp. 30-31.

<sup>17</sup> The last extensive revision was made in May, 1962. This decree, No. 542, was modified by Decree-Laws 590, 592, 650, 710, 721, and 725 of October 7, 9, and 22 and November 6, 18, and 20, 1925, respectively. Later it was modified by Law 4,763 of January 6, 1930; by the Decree with Force of Law 300 of May 20, 1931; by Law 4,996 of October 1, 1931; by Decree Law 638 of September 21, 1932; and by Law 5,806 of February 5, 1936; Law 6,250 of September 3, 1938; and Law 6,825 of February 11, 1941. On February 17, 1941, a new text, Law 6,834, revised and codified all electoral legislation. New amendments were later introduced by Law 8,987 (Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy) of September 3, 1948, which outlawed the Communist Party, and by Law 9,292 of January 8, 1949, extending suffrage to women in national elections. All electoral laws were modified again by the General Electoral Law No. 9,334, March, 1949, and Laws 12,891 and 12,918 of August, 1958. Since 1958 the electoral law has been amended five times.



### 3. Brief Sketch of Economic and Social Conditions in Chile

Both Eduardo Frei and Salvador Allende were reformers. The following discussion briefly highlights several of the conditions that they wished to rectify.

The problems of the Chilean economy are many. In the matter of overall growth, it has failed to respond to the rising expectations of an expanding population. For example, the per capita income of Chile was no higher in 1961 than it was in 1953,<sup>1</sup> yet the Chilean population, which had grown steadily at a rate of 1.8 percent per annum between 1942 and 1952, has maintained a growth rate of 2.5 percent per annum since 1953.<sup>2</sup> This has put additional stress on an economy that must increase more rapidly just to hold its own. In 1963, the Chilean gross national product grew at a rate of only 2.5 percent after climbing 7.1 percent in the previous year. It is obvious that the Chilean economy is currently in need of a vitalization to insure a high level of investment in those sectors that are capable of producing an increasing rate of growth. It should be noted that the figures presented in Table 1 represent

TABLE 1.—Growth of the Chilean Gross National Product: 1950-1963\*

|           |                            |
|-----------|----------------------------|
| 1950-1955 | 3.1% annual increase       |
| 1955-1960 | 3.8                        |
| 1960-1963 | 3.9                        |
| 1961      | 3.1                        |
| 1962      | 7.1                        |
| 1963      | 2.5 (preliminary estimate) |

\*Source: Comisión Económica para América Latina, *Estudio económico de América Latina: 1963* (New York: Naciones Unidas, 1964).

gross national product and are therefore not adjusted for either the depreciation of present capital stock or population growth. Since the population growth has hovered around 2.5 percent, it is obvious that the economy diminished radically in 1963.

A persistent political problem, whose root lies in the Chilean economy, is the presence of large foreign business interests. The chief antagonisms are generated toward the North American-owned copper-mining industry, which has been of considerable economic importance. Between 1950 and 1961, the mining sector (copper, iron, nitrates, and petroleum) contributed an annual average of 5.5 percent of the Chilean gross national product, most of which

<sup>1</sup> *La economía de Chile en el período 1953-1963*, Tomo II (Santiago: Instituto de Economía, Universidad de Chile, 1963), Cuadro No. 1, p. 2. Hereinafter cited as *La economía de Chile . . .* Tomo II. For a recent general treatment of the Chilean economy see: Comisión Económica para América Latina, *Estudio económico de América Latina*, 1963 (New York: Naciones Unidas, 1964), pp. 14-16.

<sup>2</sup> *La economía de Chile . . .* Tomo II, cuadro No. 2, p. 3.

was in copper. This percentage has been gradually declining in recent years, and in 1961 it was only 4.1 percent.<sup>3</sup> While this is a relatively small percentage of the GNP, during the same period (1950-1961) the copper industry accounted for between 45.1 percent and 64.5 percent of all Chilean exports.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the *Gran Minería* (as the large mining interests are termed in Chile) contributed an annual average of 19.1 percent of the total tax revenues of the Chilean government between 1940 and 1959.<sup>5</sup>

Naturally, the fact that such an important industry is in the hands of visibly foreign interests and the generally accepted knowledge that the Chilean economy is not healthy combine to foster strong resentments. Many Chileans feel that the copper industry is a means of systematically extracting the national riches from their country.

One of the most commonly recognized ills of the Chilean economy is its chronic inflation. Although it never quite reaches the runaway stage, inflation remains a chief problem of the economy, cutting into savings, shrinking wages and salaries, and discouraging productive investment.<sup>6</sup> The inflationary spiral has existed in Chile for many years, producing anxiety and uncertainty in almost all Chilean classes, except, perhaps, the very rich. The only manner in which middle-class Chileans have been able to defend themselves against inflation has been that of urging government measures to force wage and

**TABLE 2.—Chilean Consumer Prices for Food Products: 1955-1963 (1958=100)\***

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Index</u> |
|-------------|--------------|
| 1955        | 42           |
| 1956        | 66           |
| 1957        | 93           |
| 1958        | 100          |
| 1959        | 138          |
| 1960        | 159          |
| 1961        | 175          |
| 1962        | 205          |
| 1963 (June) | 294          |

\*Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, *Statistical Bulletin for Latin America* (New York: United Nations, 1964), Vol. I, No. 1, Table 35, p. 102.

salary increases and to implement price controls. The former, along with the large budgetary expenses for welfare state measures of which Chileans are also fond, are usually in themselves inflationary, and the latter often discourage commercial expansion, particularly in the agricultural sector.

Chilean agriculture constitutes one of the most difficult problems of the

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, cuadro No. 104, p. 81.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, cuadro No. 216, p. 176.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, cuadro No. 195, p. 156.

<sup>6</sup> See: A. O. Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), pp. 159-223.



economy. Characterized by large landholdings that generally operate at a very low level of productivity, agriculture has failed to keep pace with the rising consumption of the burgeoning Chilean population. Table 3 shows a portion of the agricultural problem. As can easily be seen, the value of production in 1959-1960 was only 6 percent higher than that of 1950, but, during the same period, the Chilean population increased by over 1,600,000 persons, or about 26 percent.<sup>7</sup>

**TABLE 3.—Value of Chilean Agricultural Production**  
(Constant 1960 escudos; 1950-51=100).\*

| Year      | Index |
|-----------|-------|
| 1950-1951 | 100   |
| 1951-1952 | 109   |
| 1952-1953 | 112   |
| 1953-1954 | 112   |
| 1954-1955 | 108   |
| 1955-1956 | 92    |
| 1956-1957 | 85    |
| 1957-1958 | 90    |
| 1958-1959 | 89    |
| 1959-1960 | 106   |

\*Source: Corporación de Fomento de la Producción, Fundación "Pedro Aguirre Cerda," *Geografía económica de Chile* (Santiago: Talleres Gráficos, "La Nación," 1962), Tomo III, Cuadro No. 38, p. 68.

This difficult situation can certainly not be attributed to a lack of agricultural credit for capital improvements. It has been pointed out that during 1956-1960 farmers received 36.3 percent of the credit extended (from both public and private sources) in all of Chile. This exceeded the credit given any other single sector of the economy.<sup>8</sup>

The ultimate causes of this lack of agricultural expansion are complex and involve subtleties too difficult to be dealt with here. However, they may generally be summed up under the heading of the *fundo*, or the large estate system. This system of land tenure in rural Chile has not changed perceptibly since colonial days, and the last real reform of the system took place in 1857, when the entailed estates were abolished. Since that time the land-owning upper class has been quite successful in preserving the agricultural system that it so greatly values. In observing the degree of land concentration in Chile in Table 4, it must be remembered that in the more fertile areas, such as the Central Valley, the divergent land areas of the large and small holdings are much greater for the entire country than is indicated here. As is shown, over 50 percent of the farms in Chile are on only about 2.8 percent of the arable land. In contrast, about 13,000 farms (8.5 percent) hold over 68 percent of Chile's arable land.

<sup>7</sup> *La economía de Chile* . . . Tomo II, cuadro No. 2, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> Corporación de Fomento de la Producción, Fundación "Pedro Aguirre Cerda," *Geografía económica de Chile* (Santiago: Talleres Gráficos "La Nación") Tomo III, pp. 75-78.

TABLE 4.—The Degree of Concentration of Arable Land in Chile\*

| Size of Farm<br>(hectares) | Number of Farms |           | Average Arable Land per Farm |           |
|----------------------------|-----------------|-----------|------------------------------|-----------|
|                            | (thousands)     | (percent) | (hectares)                   | (percent) |
| 0-9.9                      | 76              | 50.1      | 2.0                          | 2.8       |
| 10.0-49.9                  | 41              | 27.4      | 13.8                         | 10.3      |
| 50.0-199.9                 | 21              | 13.8      | 48.9                         | 18.4      |
| 200.0-999.9                | 10              | 6.3       | 176.3                        | 31.3      |
| over 1000                  | 3               | 2.2       | 604.0                        | 37.2      |

\*Source: Corporación de Fomento de la Producción, Fundación "Pedro Aguirre Cerda," *Geografía económica de Chile* (Santiago: Talleres Gráficos "La Nación," 1962), Tomo III, pp. 25-26.

Naturally, this imbalance in land concentration serves to support a social system in rural Chile in which the average *campesino* (peasant) lives a life of hardship while the landowner enjoys a comfortable existence. Most rural workers contract for their labor under the *inquilino* system, which provides the *campesino* a small wage, a mud hut, and a tiny patch of land for raising food. As one might expect, this system has led to an almost complete dependence of the *campesino* on the good graces of the *patrón* of the *fundo* for his well-being. The result is that most of the *campesinos* in Chile exist in squalid living conditions, in many instances at near-starvation levels.

In 1964 Professor Kalman H. Silvert described the general social conditions of both urban and rural Chileans as follows:

Probably about a fifth to a quarter of all Chileans live in what we think of as a modern society: they are educated, they can aspire to higher positions for their children without being unrealistic; they can talk and gather and write and read freely; they can make a fairly wide occupational choice; they have access to government and can be assured of equality before the laws; they can enjoy a wide array of material fruits of industrial life; they can belong to unions and political parties and pressure groups and professional societies and they can assume that their vote has some significance.<sup>9</sup>

Support for Silvert's conjecture that approximately one-fifth of Chileans live in this style may be given by the quotation of several statistics. In the 1955-1957 period the number of students graduated from a secondary or equivalent special school was only 4.65 percent of those completing primary school.<sup>10</sup> The infant mortality rate, though it has declined in recent years, still is very high; of all deaths in 1960 in Chile, nearly 13 percent were infants.<sup>11</sup> In Greater Santiago a study by the Instituto de Economía of the University of Chile estimated that 92 percent of the population earned less than U. S. \$84 each month. The same study discovered that 75 percent of

<sup>9</sup> K. H. Silvert, "Some Propositions on Chile," *American Universities Field Staff Report West Coast South American Series*, Vol. XI, No. 1 (January, 1964), p. 5.

<sup>10</sup> *La economía de Chile* . . . Tomo II, cuadro No. 27, p. 20. See also: Eduardo Hamuy B., *Educación elemental, analfabetismo, y desarrollo económico* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1960).

<sup>11</sup> *La economía de Chile en el período 1953-1963*, Tomo I (Santiago: Instituto de Economía, Universidad de Chile, 1963), p. 32.



the population receive less than 38 percent of the total income for the population of Santiago.<sup>12</sup> Since Santiago contains over one-quarter of the entire national population, and since the urban population is thought to be somewhat better off than that of rural Chile, it is easily seen that Professor Silvert's estimates may be overly optimistic.

The presidential campaign of 1964 was waged largely in terms of possible solutions to the briefly outlined foregoing problems. Let us now turn to the development of the campaign itself.

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

## 4. Recent Patterns of Chilean Political Behavior

In the years since World War II it has been possible to discern certain shifts in the pattern of political behavior in Chile. Since the 1920's, Chile has evolved a political system based principally on a balance between a traditional upper class and a burgeoning middle class.<sup>1</sup> The urban workers (*obreros*) and the rural peasants (*campesinos*) were originally excluded from effective political roles, and the latter are for the most part still inarticulate in politics. The *obreros*, however, have developed an active working-class movement that has affected the political system, but not yet brought them any substantial economic gains. The Chilean working class has not yet developed interest-group structures capable of transmitting demands to the political system and making sure that they will be processed into favorable political policies.<sup>2</sup> This does not mean, however, that the working class has been completely passed by in politics. Social security benefits are enjoyed by the working class, although workers obtain a lower level of benefits from the system than do other groups.<sup>3</sup> A very careful distinction, both social and legal, is made within the Chilean labor force between the *empleado* (employee) and the *obrero* (worker). The former is conceded a place on at least the lowest rung of the middle-class ladder, whereas the latter is in the working class socially somewhere below.

The effects of greater middle-class participation in the Chilean political system have not been systematically examined, but a few examples of policies that are clearly much more favorable to the middle class than to the working class may be cited. For instance, Chile is one of the few countries in the world that established a minimum salary before a minimum wage.<sup>4</sup> David Felix has examined the structure of the Chilean social security system and discovered that there has been a net redistribution of income toward the middle-class groups at the expense of the working class in the past several decades.<sup>5</sup> A more recent study of the social welfare system has shown the average pension of *empleados* to be several times that of the average retired *obrero*.<sup>6</sup>

This unequal participation in the political system in Chile has had an important consequence in the increasing support given by working-class voters

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<sup>1</sup> See John J. Johnson, *Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), Chapter 5, "Chile"; and Gil, *op. cit.*, pp. 25ff.

<sup>2</sup> Little research exists on this subject. However, a very suggestive discussion can be found in Osvaldo Sunkel, "Change and Frustration in Chile," a paper prepared for presentation at the Conference on Obstacles to Change in Latin America, Royal Institute of International Affairs, held in London in February, 1965.

<sup>3</sup> See: David Felix, "Chile," in *Economic Development*, ed. Adamantios Pepelasis, Leon Mears, and Irma Adelman (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961).

<sup>4</sup> A. O. Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963).

<sup>5</sup> Felix, *op. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> The average monthly pension of a retired *empleado público* (public employee) was 3.3 times that of the average retired worker, and that of a retired *empleado particular* (private employee) was 3.9. *El Mercurio*, December 26, 1964, p. 3.



to the parties of the extreme left. Indeed, in many respects this relationship between the working class and the Communist and Socialist parties has been so close that some unions appear to be mere political arms of these parties.<sup>7</sup> This does not mean, however, that the political parties of the far left are able completely to control the working class. The returns of the communes in the 1964 election demonstrated that Eduardo Frei was able to cut heavily into Salvador Allende's support in working-class districts despite the latter's strong alliance with the union leaders. But the increasingly precarious economic position of the Chilean worker has certainly been a major factor in augmenting the strength of the extreme left in Chile.

The growth in independence and power of the Chilean middle class has been partially derived from its advantageous position as a balance between the upper class and the working class. During the economic unrest of the 1930's the Radical Party, traditionally the party of the Chilean middle class, moved to the left and headed the Popular Front government (1938-1941) with the cooperation and support of Socialists and Communists. This pattern of center-coalition politics served the Radicals well and has become their stock-in-trade. The Popular Front died, but the Radicals retained the presidency until 1952, a period of 14 years. This centrist policy of the Radical Party was essentially non-ideological and represented an attempt to consolidate power by shifting alliances with groups both to the right and to the left of its position. The general pattern was to move to the left in the period before important elections and to move to the right in the period between them.<sup>8</sup> Thus, it was not at all incongruous to find a Radical president, Gabriel González Videla, leading the fight in 1948 to obtain passage of the Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy,<sup>9</sup> which outlawed the Communist Party, whereas only a few years earlier the Radicals and Communists had been allies in the Popular Front and the president had accepted the Communists' support for his election in 1946. The Radicals' centrist, non-ideological approach has proved in more recent times to be not only their strength but also a principal source of their weakness. With the polarization of political groups in the 1964 presidential campaign, the Radicals have seen their leverage greatly diminished. Furthermore, during their 14 years in the presidency, they gained a reputation for self-seeking opportunism that greatly aggravated the general political disillusionment of the Chilean voter. This disgust with politics was a major reason for the ascent of Carlos Ibáñez to the presidency for the second time in 1952.<sup>10</sup>

Ibáñez, who had been president between 1927 and 1931, came to power

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<sup>7</sup> There is generally a low level of worker membership in unions. Sunkel, *op. cit.*

<sup>8</sup> This persistent pattern suggests a greater lack of integration between the electoral system and the interest-group system in Chile than generally exists in the Western political democracies. The explanation for this may well lie in the fact that well over one-half of the Chilean electorate, although they vote for national offices, are not organized into effective interest groups.

<sup>9</sup> Law 8,987, September 3, 1948.

<sup>10</sup> Gil, *op. cit.* Ibáñez was a presidential candidate in 1942 also. Thus, the 1952 race was his fourth if one includes the 1938 election.

as a militaristic spokesman of Chilean nationalism. His first administration had ended in the wreckage of the Great Depression, but throughout the 1930's he had remained a strong political force supported by Chilean nationalists and proto-fascist groups. In 1938, Ibáñez might have been elected president again had it not been for an unsuccessful *coup* in which he was implicated by some of his right-wing followers just before the election. His subsequent withdrawal and his endorsement of Pedro Aguirre Cerda, the Radical nominee of the Popular Front, were the decisive factors in the election of the latter to the presidency. During the 14 years of the Radical presidency, Ibáñez was remembered as the quasi-fascist, nationalistic "strong man" who was above politics. This reputation served him well, for that was precisely what the Chilean people wanted in 1952; they were weary of the manipulative parliamentary politics of the Radicals. Ibáñez was supported by a miscellany of groups from Right to Left that produced a catch-all political platform, but his victory was essentially a personal one. After his election to the presidency, however, Ibáñez revealed himself not to be the strong man he was expected to be. In 1957, he pointed out:

I have said on several occasions that, on assuming the first office of the nation in the year 1952, I directed the government within the norms of constitutional forms. It is within the general awareness of the country that if I had believed in the existence of a necessity strong enough to break (the constitution) I would have been able to do it with the acquiescence of the major part of the citizenry, because—to speak with crude frankness—that is just what broad national sectors expected of me. Nevertheless, in obedience to firm conviction and my cool appreciation of what is fitting for the Republic, I have maintained the action of the government within the respect which is owed to the Constitution and the Laws.<sup>11</sup>

The following comment is added to this quotation by Kalman H. Silvert: "Here is a chief executive admitting that many persons voted for him precisely because he was supposed to be an anti-democratic terror, and now pointing out that he is really allowing free elections, so there!"<sup>12</sup>

This essentially *anomic* appeal (emotional, nationalistic, and anti-political) has remained with Chilean politics,<sup>13</sup> although the failure of Ibáñez to provide effective political leadership in the expected nationalist style has certainly reduced its strength. The support of Jorge Alessandri in 1958 no doubt involved some overtones of this type of appeal. Alessandri ran as an Independent and was presented as the man above politics, striving for national, rather than "political," solutions to Chile's troubles. During much of his administration, Alessandri maintained the air of a stern father lecturing Chile

<sup>11</sup> K. H. Silvert, "Elections, Parties and the Law," *American Universities Field Staff* (New York: April, 1957), mimeo p. 17 as quoted in Hirschman, *op. cit.*, p. 193n.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> For a suggestive discussion of the role of anomic appeals in the political system, see: Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 33ff.



on her weaknesses, and throughout his presidency he continued to have a cabinet in which several nominal independents served. Such tactics seemed to have served him well, for it is generally conceded that, despite the failures of his administration, when he left the presidency he was more popular personally than when he had entered it.<sup>14</sup>

The candidacy of Jorge Prat in 1964, a finance minister under Ibáñez, continued to keep the politics of the apolitical in the public eye. Although forced out of the 1964 race for reasons that will be explained later, Prat is still the leading figure of the more flamboyant nationalist line, in the vein of Ibáñez rather than in the rather staid independent style of Alessandri.<sup>15</sup>

The rise of this kind of anomic appeal in politics has probably been aided by several factors beyond the petty and self-seeking reputation of congressional politics, such as the economic uneasiness felt by almost all sectors of the Chilean population except the very rich. The anxieties of the upper, the middle, the working, and the lower classes in Chile seem to affect each of them differently. The thesis advanced in this matter in *Political Man*<sup>16</sup> by S. M. Lipset seems to be supported by the Chilean experience. Lipset argues that, when under pressure, each of these classes displays a characteristic pattern of political behavior.<sup>17</sup> The lower class and working class tend to support those political groups advocating collectivistic leftist appeals; the middle class tends to support the quasi-fascist sort of appeal; and the upper class only clings the more strongly to traditionalist types of policy.

Support for the general thesis that anomic political reactions are common among wide sections of the Chilean public is presented by a recent public opinion poll conducted by Professor Eduardo Hamuy, Director of the Center of Socio-Economic Studies of the University of Chile. Employing a nationwide sample, he discovered that in 1964 more than 90 percent of the Chileans did not belong to any political party. When pressed to select the political party that represented ideas nearest to their own, however, 40.1 percent named the Christian Democrats, and the next highest percentage (12.6 percent) chose the Socialist Party. This can be explained partially by the proximity of the 1964 campaign to the administering of the poll. The percentages of Chileans identifying themselves with both the Christian Democrats and the Socialists were doubtless influenced by the personalities of Frei and Allende. When essentially the same question was phrased in another way, "Can you tell me if you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of each one of the following parties?" 30.8 percent were favorable to the Christian Democrats and 7.2 percent opposed it. Figure I summarizes Chilean public opinion on the six major Chilean political parties, arranged along a left-to-right con-

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
<sup>14</sup> *Ercilla*, 21 October 1964, p. 6.

<sup>15</sup> For a generally good summary of the political thought of Jorge Prat see: Mario Arnello, *Proceso a una Democracia: El Pensamiento Político de Jorge Prat* (Santiago: "El Imparcial," 1965).

<sup>16</sup> New York: Anchor Books, 1963.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter 5, pp. 127-80.

**Figure 1: Favorable and unfavorable reactions of Chileans to the six major political parties, 1964.**



**TOTALS ON THE BASIS OF WHICH GRAPH IS DRAWN**

| Party              | Favorable | Unfavorable |
|--------------------|-----------|-------------|
| Communist          | 7.1       | 33.6        |
| Socialist          | 14.8      | 17.9        |
| Christian Democrat | 30.8      | 7.2         |
| Radical            | 15.8      | 14.1        |
| Liberal            | 11.5      | 11.2        |
| Conservative       | 12.8      | 16.0        |



tinuum. It is important to note that more than half of the respondents seem to have offered either no opinion or were indifferent to *all* the major parties.<sup>18</sup> This high figure certainly implies that the party system does not play the same role of stability in the political system as in, for example, the United States.<sup>19</sup>

It was predictable that much of the Ibáñez support would prove to come from middle-class groups and that the Chilean upper-class groups would show themselves strong supporters of the recent Alessandri government. It is natural that reactions should differ as electoral situations changed. The failure of Prat to obtain strong middle-class backing in 1964, although he employed the same sorts of appeals that Ibáñez had used earlier, may be attributed to the fact that the Frei candidacy offered the middle-class voter a convenient outlet for both his fears and his hopes. On one hand, Frei seemed the candidate most likely to save him from the dreaded Communist extremism of the left, and who at the same time promised a regime that was democratically oriented and reformist-minded. The Chilean upper class reluctantly threw their support to Frei when it became obvious that it had no other choice, but not before attempts had been made to persuade President Alessandri to allow a reform of the constitution so that he might run for re-election. He refused and the movement died still-born.

The Lipset thesis is further borne out by the patterns of Chilean working-class support for the extreme left.<sup>20</sup> Excluded from an integrated participation in the political system, working-class voters have often supported leftist political appeals that call for drastic renovation of the entire Chilean political, economic, and social systems. The leftist parties in Chile have maintained a consistently Marxist-oriented outlook, albeit the overtones of violent revolution are played down. But these parties, principally the Communists and Socialists, have been consistently supported by about one-fifth of the electorate and in the presidential election of 1958 this figure came closer to one-third.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Since all respondents were questioned as to their reaction to all the parties, it cannot be assumed that those who were indifferent to one or another of the parties were indifferent to all the parties. Thus, it cannot be assumed *absolutely* that over 50 percent of the Chilean electorate evidence apathy toward the party system, although the data incline us in that direction. At the time of the present writing, however, only the preliminary results of Professor Hamuy's investigation are available. It may well be that a later analysis will subject this hypothesis to a more rigorous testing and result in some alterations of it.

<sup>19</sup> See especially: V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961), Chapter 12, "The Family," pp. 293-314. Key makes the point that party identification in the U.S. is intrinsically interwoven in the complex of emotional and social relationships within the family and thus is learned along with other values by the young. Fewer than 10 percent of the voters in the U.S. decline to identify themselves as either Republicans or Democrats (pp. 66-67), which contrasts with the much higher degree of indifference to political parties among the Chilean voters cited above.

<sup>20</sup> For a brief discussion of the Chilean working-class movement see: R. J. Alexander, "Brazil, Argentina, Chile" in Walter Galenson (ed.) *Labor in Developing Countries* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 138-86 and especially pp. 168-75. A broader treatment by the same author is offered in his *Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962).

<sup>21</sup> *Chile: Election Factbook*, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-36.

Another recent important change in Chilean political behavior has taken place in the countryside. Formerly, the voters in the *campo* were few and they chiefly supported the conservative aristocracy. The 1952 presidential campaign, however, marked the beginning of a change in this traditional pattern of political participation. To the *campesino* of the great *fundos* of the central valley, Ibáñez' demands for alteration of the economic situation of the entire country held forth new promise. Since 1952 the politicization of the *campesino* has increased steadily. The political forces of the far left, once oriented almost solely toward the urban worker, have begun to direct reformist appeals to the peasantry and have found the response gratifying. The result has been that one of the strongholds of the *Frente de Acción Popular* (FRAP), the leftist coalition formed in 1956, is to be found in the countryside. Salvador Allende did well in a number of rural areas as the FRAP presidential candidate in 1958 and maintained his strength in these areas in 1964, although Eduardo Frei was given even stronger support there in the recent election.

The increase in voting in the countryside was part of the reason for the large increase in the total Chilean electorate in recent years, but it does not account for all of it. Before the 1958 and 1962 reforms, numerous obstacles to registration seriously hampered the Chilean system and resulted in a relatively small number of registered voters. Voter records were kept for ten years; then all registrations became invalid, and re-registration was necessary. Registries were open only the first eight days of each month, except during the six months before the election and 90 days after it. In the case of closely scheduled elections, registration periods were reduced in practice to 15 or 20 days (eight days every month). In 1962, registration lists were made permanent, and they now become invalid only if 15 or more names have been removed because of death, change of residence, or other reasons specified by law. Hours for registration also have been extended. As a result of easier registration procedures, as well as stronger penalties for abstention from voting, the percentage of the population registering and voting has risen substantially in recent years. Between 1952 and 1958 the number of registered voters increased from 833,460 to 1,156,576, whereas between 1958 and 1964 the number registered increased by 1,758,545 for a total of 2,915,121. Over one-half of those voting in the 1964 presidential election had therefore never voted before. Even more important than the increase in rural voting participation has been the rise in the female vote. Until 1949 women were allowed to vote only in municipal elections. By 1952 they constituted 30 percent of those casting votes, but this percentage did not increase substantially (although the total number of women increased as the total electorate did) until after 1960. In 1964, 1,332,814 or 45.7 percent of the voters were women. Apart from the general rise in the female vote, many new registrants, both men and women, were entered in the books from the working- and lower-class districts.

During the past ten years the complexion of the Chilean party system has changed considerably as many political parties joined blocs and the total



number of parties decreased sharply. This latter development has been especially noticeable in the past few years.<sup>22</sup> Also, the Radical Party, which held the key to coalition politics for the past 25 years as leader or partner of Center-Left and Center-Right alliances, has surrendered its position to the Christian Democrats. The roots of this decline of the Radical Party lie in the 14-year period between 1938 and 1952, when this party held the presidency. Lack of effectiveness in dealing with the accelerating inflation during the last years of the administration of Gabriel González Videla (1946-1952) greatly reduced the party's popularity, and the poor showing of Pedro Alfonso, the Radical presidential candidate who ran a weak third in 1952, was indicative of the Radicals' decline.

In 1952, when the Chilean voters turned to Carlos Ibáñez for leadership, this shift could be attributed in great measure to the failures of the Radicals.<sup>23</sup> With the exception of the right-wing Liberals and Conservatives, the strong adherents of the Radical Party, and the ideologically splintered Socialists, Ibáñez' support came from all parts of the political spectrum. The outlawed Communist Party formally supported Allende, but many Communists worked for Ibáñez' election alongside quasi-fascist nationalists and members of the disillusioned middle- and working-class groups who were heavily affected by the rapidly advancing inflation. Ibáñez was the clear choice of all sections of Chile; he won a majority in Santiago and Valparaíso, the two most populous areas, and led the voting in 15 other provinces. The rightist candidate Matte led in six predominantly rural provinces and the Radical standard-bearer Alfonso in only two.

The expectation that Ibáñez would break the pattern of parliamentary coalition politics that had predominated under the Radicals proved to be a false hope. As pointed out earlier, Ibáñez chose instead to continue the same style of political manipulation that had been so futile during the Radical years. In attempting alternately, and sometimes simultaneously, to appeal to both the Left and the Right, he proved to be a poor political operator. It is interesting to note that while Ibáñez declared a "state of siege" in 1954 to break a coppermine workers' strike, he also championed the 1958 relegalization of the Communist Party. Thus he veered from Left to Right during his administration, and at its end had managed to alienate almost all the major groups that had supported him.

The 1958 presidential election saw a resurgence of the political parties. The tendency toward the political bloc became quite clear in this election. On the left the *Frente de Acción Popular* (FRAP) presented Salvador Allende as its candidate. Under Allende's leadership the splinter Socialist

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<sup>22</sup> Gil, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-44.

<sup>23</sup> There are some members of the Radical Party who maintain that the strong support given to private education by the González Videla administration also contributed to weakening the Party. Those holding this view maintain that by increasing the funds available to Catholic educational institutions, González Videla augmented the scope and power of the Church as a social and political force, to the detriment of the Radicals.

groups had reintegrated themselves into a reunified Socialist Party. The Communist Party, although outlawed, cooperated with and supported the FRAP when it was formed and later became formal members of it after their relegalization. The Chilean Left faced the 1958 elections unified as they had not been since the presidential election of 1938.

To the right of the FRAP were the Christian Democrats (CD), led by Eduardo Frei. The origins of the CD were in the Conservative Party. During the late 1930's, a group of reformist-minded young Catholics led by Frei, Radimiro Tomic, Bernardo Leighton, and several others formed a conservative youth group that evolved in 1938 into the *Falange Nacional*, the direct forerunner of the Christian Democratic Party.<sup>24</sup> While the *Falange* had participated in congressional and municipal elections since 1941, it was never able to muster more than 5 percent of the national vote until the municipal election of 1956, when it obtained a total of 6 percent. Since that time, however, its rise has been rapid. In 1958, the *Falange*, now transformed into the Christian Democratic Party, felt itself strong enough to put Frei forward as its own candidate, and he obtained a respectable 20.7 percent of the vote. This total surpassed the vote for Luis Bossay, the Radical candidate, and was a portent of the future, in which the Radicals lost their centrist position to the Christian Democrats.

In 1958, the Chilean traditional Right attempted to present its best side by supporting Jorge Alessandri, a former senator, who ran for president as an independent. In the campaign that followed he was elected by a slim plurality, 33,500 votes out of a total of 1,250,350. The lower-class support of the unfrocked priest, Antonio Zamorano, which presumably would have gone to the FRAP candidate had Zamorano not been in the race, was sufficient to keep Allende from obtaining a plurality of the popular vote. It is not clear that the Congress (which must choose the president-elect if no candidate obtains an absolute majority) would have allowed Allende to take office had he obtained a plurality, but the vote for Zamorano made the question academic.<sup>25</sup>

Following the 1958 election it was possible to discern clearly a trisection in the Chilean political spectrum. The Left was pre-empted by the unified forces of the FRAP, the Center was occupied by the Christian Democrats to the left and the Radicals on the right, and the Right was composed of the Liberals and Conservatives. The Chilean electorate indicated their support of the center-rightist orientation of the Alessandri government by supplying the Liberal and Conservative parties with a total of more than 29 percent of their votes in the 1960 municipal election. The Radical Party, shifting toward the right in its support of the Alessandri program, was able to command about 20 percent of the vote, and the FRAP lost considerably, obtaining a

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<sup>24</sup> For a partisan presentation of the origins and development of the Christian Democratic Party see Ricardo Borzard, *La Democracia Cristiana en Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Orbe, 1963). A book written partially in answer to Borzard's enthusiasm for the Christian Democrats is Luis Vitales, *Esencia y apariencia de la Democracia Cristiana* (Santiago: Arencibia Hnos., 1964).

<sup>25</sup> *Chile: Election Factbook*, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-36.



combined total of less than 20 percent of the vote. The Christian Democrats, while receiving only about 14 percent of the vote, elected more municipal councilmen (*regidores*) than did the combined parties of the FRAP.

Alessandri's austerity program, while comforting to some businessmen and "monetarists,"<sup>26</sup> soon lost its appeal to the Chilean masses, as the effects of the economic contraction began to be felt. In the 1961 congressional elections, the parties of the Center-Left and the Left did very well. The FRAP secured more votes than any other political bloc or single party, almost 31 percent of the valid vote, and, in addition, they came out of the election in control of 27.5 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The Communist Party won 4 of the 25 Senate seats being contested and 16 seats in the Chamber, and the Socialists emerged from the election with 7 Senate seats and 17 in the Chamber. The Christian Democrats also made dramatic advances, securing more votes than the Conservatives and coming into control of 14.6 percent of the Chamber's seats. They obtained 4 Senate seats and 23 seats in the Chamber, and an overall vote of almost 15 percent.<sup>27</sup>

The government coalition, the *Frente Democrático* (FD), which was formalized when the Liberals and Conservatives were joined by the Radicals in August, 1961, maintained a narrow majority of the votes in both houses of Congress. The Radical Party was, however, the only one in the center-right coalition that was able to maintain its voting strength in the 1961 elections. The Conservatives, who had polled over 20 percent of the vote in the five elections between 1944 and 1950, acquired about 14 percent of the vote, less than the Christian Democrats' total of about 16 percent. As a result of the 1961 congressional election, the Radicals established themselves as the keystone of the governmental coalition and gradually moved to the right, the center position being pre-empted by the Christian Democrats.

The municipal elections of 1963 provided the battleground for the three large party blocs. The FRAP saw these elections as a testing ground for the 1964 presidential campaign, and Salvador Allende was again announced as the FRAP 1964 nominee for president before the 1963 contest was held. The Christian Democrats did not announce that Eduardo Frei would be their 1964 nominee, although it was a foregone conclusion, and they were not hesitant to generalize about the significance of the municipal elections in the coming presidential race. Senator Frei was quoted as stating that the municipal contest would indicate the road for Chile in the presidential election.<sup>28</sup> The *Frente Democrático* had yet to select their 1964 candidate, although Senator Julio Durán was a leading contender for the position.

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<sup>26</sup> For a discussion of the "Monetarist" and "Structuralist" positions now common among so many Latin American economists, see: A. O. Hirschman, "Ideologies of Economic Development in Latin America," pp. 3-42; and Joseph Grunwald, "The 'Structuralist' School on Price Stability and Development: The Chilean Case," pp. 95-124 in A. O. Hirschman (ed.) *Latin American Issues* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).

<sup>27</sup> *Chile: Election Factbook*, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

<sup>28</sup> *El Mercurio*, April 6, 1963, p. 29.

The municipal elections resulted in a great victory for the Christian Democrats, who, led by Frei, had maintained a strong opposition to the Alessandri government throughout his administration. Occasionally, in fact, the positions taken by the CD congressional leaders were more sharply antagonistic to the president than were those of the FRAP leaders. This policy of vocal opposition obviously profited the CD in the municipal elections, for they gained 22.7 percent of the votes—more than that received by any other political party. The FRAP's hopes of promoting their presidential aspirations were dashed by a failure to improve upon their previous levels of support. Whereas both the Communists and Socialists had recorded some slight gains in the 1961 congressional elections, the combined total of FRAP votes fell from nearly 31 percent in 1961 to 29.5 percent in 1963. It is interesting to note that the minor parties of the FRAP experienced the heaviest losses—a further indication of the tendency toward a decrease in the number of political parties. The *Frente Democrático* did not do as well as it had done in 1961, when it had polled a combined total of over 53 percent of the vote. The *Frente* could, however, take solace in its showing of slightly over 47 percent and could attribute its losses to a "natural attrition." The fact that the Radical Party alone managed to maintain its strength assured it of a continued dominant position in the FD and provided it with the hope that the 1964 presidential candidate would be selected from within its ranks.<sup>29</sup>

The heavy 1963 vote for the CD plus the strength of the FRAP gave the opposition a majority of the total ballots. However, the government could still claim the dominant position in the political spectrum, since its total vote was larger than any other single bloc, and, furthermore, the FD could take some comfort in its control of a majority in the Congress. Majority control meant that if the 1964 presidential election was thrown into the Congress—as it certainly would be in the expected three-way race, since no candidate could expect to gain an absolute majority—the *Frente* parties would select the new president. Although the Congress had never in any previous presidential election passed over the candidate who won a relative majority, the Chilean constitution clearly gives that body the power to do so. There was some question as to whether or not Allende might be passed over in the event that he became the leading candidate in the 1964 balloting, but the political feasibility of such a move was doubtful, i.e., would the country as a whole accept such a decision? Subsequent events do not provide an answer, for the 1964 battle was fought on grounds entirely different from those that had been expected in 1963.

In sum, the years between the end of World War II and the present have constituted a period of great change in the patterns of political participation in Chile. A gradual shift away from the working class and toward the middle and upper classes has occurred in the distribution of the national

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<sup>29</sup> *Chile: Election Factbook*, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39.



income.<sup>30</sup> This fact, along with the enormous rise in the number of Chileans voting, has contributed to a large increase in popular support for extreme-left and center-left political parties. The increase in the female vote in Chile generally has strengthened the Christian Democrats more than any other party, although the women gave more support to Alessandri in 1958 than to any other candidate.

Also, this period has witnessed the rise of nationalist political appeals that emphasize the emotional and anti-political and thus cater to a growing disillusionment with traditional Chilean party politics. These forces were at their height during Ibáñez' campaign, but his lack of effectiveness in office restored considerable confidence in the party system. This type of appeal has continued to hold some popularity, particularly among the nationalist intellectuals (such as Jorge Prat and his followers), but the victory of the CD in 1964 seems to have cut the ground from under these groups, at least for the time being. If, however, Frei proves to be unable to implement his program, or if his program, once implemented, proves ineffective in dealing with Chile's problems, there may be a resurgence of this disillusionment.

Another important change in Chilean politics since 1950 centers about the rise of political participation in rural areas. Peasant support went first to Ibáñez in 1952, but in recent years it has aided the FRAP more than other groups. The Christian Democrats, however, have given the peasantry much attention, and, as we shall see, they made considerable inroads into this source of FRAP support in the 1964 election. Finally, an important recent change in Chilean politics involves the move toward broad political blocs representing major political groups along a left-right continuum: the Left has consolidated itself into the FRAP; the Center has been taken over from the Radicals by the CD; and the Right is represented by the Radicals, the Liberals, and the Conservatives.

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<sup>30</sup> For an interesting reappraisal of official figures on the distribution of income in Chile, see: Helio Varela Casanova, *Estratificación social de la población trabajadora en Chile y su participación en el Ingreso Nacional, 1940-1954* (Memoria de la Escuela de Economía, Universidad de Chile).

## 5. The 1964 Presidential Campaign

The 1964 Chilean presidential campaign began early; soon after the 1963 municipal elections there were four declared candidates in the field and all had begun campaigning. As noted above, the FRAP had selected Senator Salvador Allende Gossens as its candidate. Although the FRAP's showing in the municipal elections was not overly encouraging, it had the effect of galvanizing Allende and his organization into an early mobilization of forces for they knew that the road to the presidency was to be a long and hard one.

Senator Allende was experienced in campaigning. Although only 55 in 1963, he had had a long and active political life. As a student in the University of Chile, he had been expelled for political reasons, and he had returned to complete his degree in medicine and continue actively in politics. Under the Popular Front government of Pedro Aguirre Cerda, Allende served as Minister of Public Health (1939-1942), and in 1945 he was elected to the Chilean Senate as a Socialist. He had served without interruption in the Senate since that time. In the 1952 presidential elections, Allende led the Socialists who opposed Carlos Ibáñez. Against a number of Socialist splinter groups supporting Ibáñez (along with the underground Communists), he received only 5.5 percent of the vote. After the election, Allende maintained a position of leadership among those Socialists who consistently opposed Ibáñez; he became instrumental in the eventual reunification of the Socialist Party; and he assisted in the creation of the *Frente de Acción Popular* (FRAP) in 1956 in cooperation with the Communist Party, which was illegal at that time, and with other political groups. He was nominated by the FRAP for the presidency in 1958 and, with the backing of all the major Socialist and Communist political organizations, narrowly missed gaining a relative majority in the election.<sup>1</sup>

It is interesting to note that Allende, although a Marxist, generally has the respect of many upper-class Chileans. By Chilean standards, he is considered a member of the professional upper class. A noteworthy facet of Chilean political culture is that few in Chile think it at all extraordinary that a well-off near-aristocrat should be the major national leader of the Marxist-oriented left.<sup>2</sup>

The Christian Democrats gave considerable thought to the proper course to take in the 1964 elections. Throughout the Alessandri administration they had maintained a strong opposition to the government, and the Chilean voters had rewarded them well at the polls for their efforts. From 1958 the party's appeal had expanded rapidly. Shortly after their strong showing in the 1963 municipal election, the major leaders of the party met to plan their 1964 strategy. Although there was talk of possible alliance with some parties of

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<sup>1</sup> *Chile: Election Factbook*, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-36.

<sup>2</sup> *Ercilla*, May 20, 1964, p. 4.



the FRAP or the Radicals, such proposals were rejected and the decision was made to fight for the 1964 presidency alone, as the CD had done in 1958. The party put forward Senator Eduardo Frei Montalva as its candidate.

✓ Senator Frei had been the principal leader of the Chilean Christian Democrats since their earliest days as the *Falange Nacional*. When he was nominated in 1963, he was 52 years old and had served in the Chilean Senate since 1949. He is married to Maria Tagle, the daughter of an old upper-class family; they have seven children.<sup>3</sup> Frei is a dynamic campaigner and is at his best when attacking the opposition. He frequently used the Senate floor for this purpose, particularly under the Alessandri government. Frei has impressed many persons during his life with his leadership talents. In an often quoted statement, Gabriela Mistral, the Chilean author and Nobel Prize winner (1938), predicted in the 1930's that Frei would one day be president of Chile. In contrast to Allende, Frei as a person often arouses animosity among the Chilean upper class. Not of the traditional upper class himself, he has been resented for showing antagonism to this group. Having begun as a member of the Conservative Party, and having married into an old Chilean family, Frei was expected to follow the traditional path of middle-class young men who make good marriages and accommodate themselves to the points of view of the upper class. Young men of this sort have been a source of strength for the Chilean upper class for over a century.<sup>4</sup> Frei, however, did not follow their rules. He turned against the Conservative Party and became a major critic of the upper classes and their politics. His irreproachable private life, his reputation for lacking an appreciation of the "good" life, his devotion to his religion, and, above all, his violent attacks on the Alessandri government, are all held against him by the upper-class Chileans. Normally, such matters would not be of much concern to a political analysis such as this, but these personal antagonisms to Frei help to explain some of the elements of the 1964 election.

Following the 1963 municipal elections, the Radicals submitted a list of six possible candidates to the central directive committee of the *Frente Democrático* for its approval. The left wing of the Radical Party had never been happy with the party's cooperation with the Alessandri government, and there was some strong feeling that it might better its lot by making an alliance with either Allende or Frei. Of the two, Allende was mentioned more often, probably because of the traditional anti-Catholic feeling of the Radicals. This group had little leverage, however, as the conservative wing of the party was firmly in control. When leftist rumblings became audible the former Radical president, Gabriel González Videla, broke a long silence to denounce the leftists in the party and proclaim his support of Senator Julio Durán, the leader of the right wing of the Radical party.<sup>5</sup> Although González Videla's

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<sup>3</sup> *Ercilla*, November 4, 1964, pp. 7-9.

<sup>4</sup> For a description of the Chilean upper class see: Alberto Edwards, *La fronda aristocrática* (Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico, 1952).

<sup>5</sup> *Ercilla*, May 27, 1963, pp. 10-11. The left wing of the Radical Party constituted about one-third of the membership of that party's National Convention held in June, 1961.

support was not decisive, it was important, and when Durán was chosen as the nominee, González Videla became the president of the *Frente* for the campaign.

Although Senator Durán was only 45 when chosen as the *Frente* candidate, he had a long record of hard work and service to the Radical Party. He was the president of the Radical Youth between 1942 and 1944; he was first elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1945, where he remained until 1957; he was president of the Chamber of Deputies from 1955 to 1957; and he was elected Senator in 1957. Durán, a colorful speaker, was clearly the best television politician of all the candidates in 1964. Although now a wealthy man, Durán has a middle-class background and in many respects is an excellent exemplar of today's Radical Party in his own life.<sup>6</sup>

The fourth candidate in the field in 1963 was Jorge Prat, the 46-year-old former minister of finance under Ibáñez.<sup>7</sup> He had inherited the Ibáñez anti-political tradition, and throughout his campaign constantly argued for the necessity of strong national solutions to Chilean problems. Prat in general is anti-United States, anti-big business, and anti-politics. While his candidacy was not taken as a serious threat to the three major contenders, the possibility existed that he might be able to capture enough votes from one of the other candidates to influence the outcome of a four-way race. Prat was the only candidate with an entirely personalistic following, and a new party, the *Acción Nacional*, was created for his campaign.<sup>8</sup>

The last six months of 1963 were filled with hard campaigning, and all the candidates were constantly touring the country from north to south drumming up support. Despite the law against campaigning until six months before a presidential election, propaganda was already widespread all over Chile; newspapers were carrying full-page political advertisements, and indications of a campaign in full swing were apparent everywhere in the closing months of 1963. During this period the principal lines of argument were generally predictable. Allende maintained a constant line of political argument throughout the campaign. Indeed, the principal points of emphasis had been developed in the 1958 campaign, and had remained roughly unchanged during the intervening period. The fundamental appeal was for a basic change in the economic, social, and political structure of the country. The large industrialists, the great *fundo* owners, the foreign investors (particularly copper mining), and the major financiers all came under fire from the FRAP.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> *Chile: Election Factbook*, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

<sup>7</sup> Arnello, *loc. cit.*

<sup>8</sup> *El Mercurio*, January 7, 1964, p. 21.

<sup>9</sup> The following summation of the programs of Salvador Allende and Eduardo Frei is based primarily on newspaper reports, articles in periodicals, and campaign literature. Of particular use were two articles by Ruben Corvalán ("Dos hombres, dos programas" Part I, *Ercilla*, May 20, 1964, pp. 14-15, and Part II, *Ercilla*, May 27, 1964). The staffs on technical advice for each of the candidates also produced some useful technical arguments to support the policy stands. For the FRAP, the document *Las bases técnicas del plan de acción del gobierno popular* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1964), hereinafter cited as *Las bases*. For the Christian Democrats the three "Declarations of Millahue" constitute a good review of Frei's general position.



In terms of specific proposals, Dr. Allende and the FRAP promised that if elected they would work to implement the following: (1) reduction of the voting age to 18; (2) abolition of the literacy test for suffrage qualifications; (3) establishment of an automatic system of voting registration; (4) a series of fundamental social welfare rights would be guaranteed all Chileans; (5) all workers would be given the right to strike and to unionize; (6) higher social welfare payments to workers' families (rural and urban) would be guaranteed to those now being paid them, and would be extended to new groups; (7) unions would be guaranteed the right to belong to both national and international federations; (8) old age and children's benefits would be extended; (9) a free education would be guaranteed; (10) the independence of the judicial power would be assured; and (11) the army would be democratized. To be certain that the measures would eventually be passed, the FRAP called for a parliamentary reform to make the Congress more democratic and to assure a majority representation to the Chilean working class. The implementation of these and the other reforms summarized below would, in the long run, need the promulgation of a new constitution; but, at the present time, Allende maintained, many changes could be made within the existing framework.<sup>10</sup>

Senator Allende proposed a building up of the power of the provinces and an eventual decline in the power of the office of the chief executive. He also promised implementation of the provision of the 1925 constitution concerning the creation of provincial assemblies; this had hitherto been ignored.

In the economic field, very detailed proposals were put forward by the FRAP, which created the *Oficina Central de Planificación* (Central Planning Office—OCEPLAN) to coordinate economic and social plans both for propaganda purposes and for the forthcoming administration, should Allende win. OCEPLAN was headed by the economist Max Nolf, and many leftist Chilean social scientists and planners contributed their services to it. Under Nolf's direction, OCEPLAN produced an analysis of the present economic situation of Chile and detailed action plans.<sup>11</sup> The FRAP plans called for drastic changes in the Chilean economy: (1) the minerals of Chile would become the property of the state; copper, nitrate, and iron mining would be nationalized, and eventually the petroleum distributing companies would be nationalized as well; (2) the national banking system would be reorganized and private banks nationalized; (3) the government would nationalize public utilities, and insurance companies would exert strong control over foreign trade; (4) the state would take the lead in promoting the development of heavy industry; (5) income would be redistributed through such measures as a tax reform that would put the inactive resources of the well-off classes to work through state investment; (6) to protect the purchasing power of the mass of people, controls would be placed upon the distribution of consumer goods; and (7) the rights of small businessmen would be protected by the state.

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<sup>10</sup> Corvalán, "Dos hombres, dos programas," Part II, *op. cit.*

<sup>11</sup> *Las bases, loc. cit.*

One of the most persistent themes of the FRAP candidate was the necessity of finding a solution to the problem of agriculture's low productivity. Under the program proposed by Allende, the *latifundios* would be expropriated and the *fundo* system would give way to a new system based upon mixed state, collective, and private farms. The *minifundia* that abound in Chile would be abolished and the land now divided into very small holdings would be consolidated into larger, more economically viable, plots. Allende indicated that no more than 35 percent of the arable land would be taken over by the state or collectivized. The remaining amount would remain in private hands. The FRAP proposed that the government pay for the expropriated properties by 30-year bonds with an annual interest of 4 percent and with provisions to compensate for inflation. It was also pointed out that there would be some readjustment for the collection of back taxes owed by many of these land owners.<sup>12</sup> The government would also expand the irrigation facilities, provide for the unionization of the peasants, and prohibit the resale of the land to avoid the development of new concentrations of landholdings.

In the international field, the FRAP position was clear. If Dr. Allende became president of Chile, immediate steps would be taken to free Chile from certain of its ties with the United States. The military pacts with the United States would be abrogated and "a policy of dignity" would be followed in dealings with the "Colossus to the North." The FRAP program declared the FRAP to be against racism, colonialism, and the armaments race; and for the defense of human rights throughout the world, national self-determination, and, in the Western hemisphere, very strongly on Cuba's side in her disputes with the United States. Senator Allende had made visits to China, the Soviet Union, and Cuba, and he maintained that his administration would establish good relations with all three of these countries and with other nations of the Socialist bloc.<sup>13</sup>

Senator Eduardo Frei also took a strong reformist line in his campaign. It differed from that of the FRAP in tone and emphasis more than in substance. The CD promised that they too would implement electoral reforms and possibly lower the voting age. They also advocated legislation to limit campaign expenditures so that the large economic interests would no longer have as strong a voice in the campaign. Furthermore, Frei would push for a reform of the public administration; there would be provision for the separation of private economic interests from the public administration to limit "conflict of interest" situations; and the administrative tribunals provided for by the constitution, but never set up by law, would be established. There would be a measure providing for the simplification of the legislative procedure and giving more power to the executive, and the executive would also obtain the power to submit projects of law to a national referendum in the event that the Congress refused to pass measures requested by the president. There would be a new statute to deal with political parties, which would restrict the

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, Capítulo II, p. 1213.

<sup>13</sup> Corvalán, Part I, *op. cit.*



power of their bureaucratic structure. The judiciary would be made a more active and independent branch of the government, and a system of popularly elected judges would be established to democratize the lower court system.<sup>14</sup>

In the economic field the Christian Democrats also advocated an extension of state control over the economy, although not to the degree advocated by the FRAP. Tax reforms to facilitate a more equitable distribution of income would be undertaken, as well as a simplification of the administrative procedure of levying taxes.

In banking, the public function of the *Banco Central* would be transferred to the *Banco del Estado* and private banks to permit the *Banco Central* to concentrate its activities on its role of formulator of monetary policy. Savings would be encouraged, especially among the middle and upper classes, through the issuance of Social and Economic Development Bonds and through provisions for preventing inflation from devaluating money deposited in savings accounts. The policy of fostering economic development through the extension of state credit to private businessmen would be continued and enlarged, but provisions for insuring that the money borrowed was used for the intended purposes would also be instituted.

Frei's program proposed to deal with the problem of copper by enlarging state control over the industry. He hoped that copper production could be raised so as to augment the amount of foreign exchange earned and aid in gaining revenue for the implementation of the development plans of the government. The objective of this program would be to raise copper exports to \$200 million annually, with a production increase of 600,000 tons between 1964 and 1970. Other goals listed were the refining of all Chilean copper within the country, the creation of a state monopoly to handle sales of copper in the world market, and the selling of Chilean copper to all nations, regardless of ideological considerations. If the North American copper companies refused to go along with this program, they would be nationalized. In other mining activities, iron and nitrate, the state would exercise strong controls, but their development would be encouraged by special state financing and other measures.<sup>15</sup>

In foreign trade, a Christian Democratic government would develop trade relations with all countries, including those of the Socialist (i.e., Soviet) bloc. It would exercise extensive controls on imports and exports with an eye toward building up domestic industry and the creation of foreign markets for Chilean goods. A strong endorsement of the Latin-American Free-Trade area concept was also a part of the CD program.<sup>16</sup>

The agrarian reform proposed by Senator Frei had the same goals as those advocated by Allende's forces: higher productivity and an increase in

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<sup>14</sup> Corvalán, Part II, *op. cit.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

social justice for the *inquilino*. Large and inefficient holdings would be expropriated and paid for in 25-year bonds at 5 percent interest after a 10 percent down payment. Further, increases in agricultural productivity would be encouraged through a series of complex policies ranging from the taxation of the potential productivity of land rather than its actual output, in order to discourage leaving land fallow, to stimulating the creation of agricultural cooperatives, granting a favored status to importers of agricultural machinery, and encouraging the development of industries that are dependent upon agricultural products. The peasant would be unionized, guaranteed a minimum wage, and in many cases given his own land. There would also be an intensification of soil conservation projects, both to save the land for more productive agriculture and to stimulate the growth of lumber.

In broad terms, the Frei campaign was to emphasize the theme of revolution, but it was to be a "Revolution in Liberty." The essence of Chilean Christian Democratic doctrine is the belief in social pluralism and political democracy. Most Christian Democrats see themselves as leftists and Catholics. As Catholics they consider themselves anti-Marxists, but as leftists they cannot allow themselves to be undemocratic in their anti-Marxism. Frei promised a transformation of Chile hardly less dramatic and far-reaching than the one promised by his Socialist opponent, but he constantly stated that his would be one that would employ democratic rather than totalitarian means, thereby obviously implying that his leftist opponent well might use the latter.<sup>17</sup> The active Catholicism of the Christian Democratic movement has always been a point of contention in partisan struggles. Ideologically, Christian Democrats attempt to refute the frequent charges of their adversaries that they are a Church party by pointing out that they accept religious pluralism and that in working toward a just social order they are willing to cooperate with any group whatever its religious beliefs. In the 1964 campaign the Christian Democrats' appeal to a sort of impersonal nationalism within a democratic framework served to counteract these charges and to overshadow the clerical color inherent in the party.

Throughout the closing six months of 1963, the presidential campaign gradually increased in intensity. The four-way race seemed destined to be a close one, with Durán the favorite, and Frei and Allende not far behind. It is difficult to describe Durán's campaign line in as great detail as was devoted above to those of Allende and Frei. Both Allende and Frei had large forces of intellectuals working for them, mapping plans, and devising solutions to Chile's problems. Since Durán and the *Frente Democrático* represented the forces of *status quo* Chile, there was no complex series of proposals to present to the public. The Radicals had taken the lead in pushing through the Agrarian Reform Law of 1962 (obviously with an eye toward the 1964 presidential election), but one could hardly term the program of the *Frente* anything more than a promise to continue the policy line followed by the Alessandri

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<sup>17</sup> See: "Third Declaration of Millahue," *El Mercurio*, April 21, 1964, p. 27.



government. Shortly after the beginning of 1964, however, a political event smashed all hopes of the *Frente* for the presidency, changed the entire complexion of the campaign, and rendered any *Frente* program irrelevant.

In the 1961 congressional election it was evident that the FRAP parties had continued to make gains in rural Chile. One of the Socialist deputies elected from rural districts that year was Oscar Naranjo. He was elected from Curicó, a small province south of Santiago in the Chilean central valley. Naranjo was but one of several deputies representing the area under Chile's complex system of proportional representation, so that when he died in office and a special election was scheduled for March 15, 1964 to replace him, it was not at all a foregone conclusion that a Socialist would replace him. Since there was only one office to be filled instead of three—as had been the case in the regular 1961 election—Curicó became a single-member district with election by plurality for the special election. In the 1963 municipal elections, the parties of the *Frente Democrático* had been able to obtain almost as many total votes as the FRAP parties and the Christian Democrats together. Thus the leaders of the *Frente* felt that they had little to fear from the transformation of the special election in Curicó into a national test, and they confidently

TABLE 5.—Curicó's Voting Record in Recent Elections\*

|                      | <u>Frente</u> | <u>FRAP</u> | <u>CD</u> | <u>Others</u> |
|----------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------|---------------|
| 1958 (Presidential)  | 8,967         | 6,087       | 3,107     | 826           |
| 1961 (Municipal)     | 10,169        | 3,538       | 1,839     | 1,442         |
| 1961 (Parliamentary) | 11,369        | 4,610       | 4,188     | 309           |
| 1963 (Municipal)     | 11,041        | 6,330       | 4,974     | 404           |

\*Source: *El Mercurio*, March 10, 1964, p. 21.

nominated a conservative *regidor* from Curicó, Rodolfo Ramírez. The decision to make the Curicó election into a national test was partly influenced by the successful emphasis placed upon the election of an *Alessandrista* in the special election of 1958 in the Third District of Santiago, during Alessandri's presidential pre-campaign.

The FRAP accepted the challenge. It nominated Oscar Naranjo, son of the deceased deputy who had represented the district. The younger Naranjo had practiced medicine in Curicó and had earned a considerable reputation for his charitable work among Curicó's poor. The CD did not wish to be drawn into an electoral battle in Curicó, but once the FRAP decided to accept the challenge of the *Frente* to fight a miniature national election, it had no choice but to nominate its own candidate. Mario Fuenzalida, a CD *regidor* from Curicó, was selected. Jorge Prat chose not to have a candidate represent him in the election and was thus able to attack the whole election as a cynical "show" in which the people of Curicó were being sacrificed to the national ambitions of the large parties.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> *El Mercurio*, March 13, 1964, p. 31.

By late January, all three candidates for the vacant seat were nominated and had begun campaigning. It was pointed out a number of times by the confident *Frente* that Curicó was an "electoral type" as a district, with approximately the same urban-rural balance as the country as a whole.<sup>19</sup> The expectation of the *Frente*, however, that its cause would be bolstered by the Curicó election was premature. Each of the three presidential candidates made several trips to Curicó during the campaign, and all spent the final days before the election in that province. It was a rugged and harshly fought battle that saw threats and counterthreats, violence and reprisals,<sup>20</sup> and its results drastically altered the complexion of the entire presidential campaign.

The outcome of the Curicó election was a stunning defeat for Julio Durán and the government coalition. Just before the election, the *Frente* leaders were asked for their predictions, and they estimated that their candidate would obtain about 14,500 (56 percent) of an expected turnout of about 26,000. The FRAP was more cautious, predicting 10,000 votes for Naranjo.<sup>21</sup> The final results were as follows:

|                       |        |        |
|-----------------------|--------|--------|
| Oscar Naranjo (FRAP)  | 9,540  | 39.5%  |
| Rodolfo Ramírez (FD)  | 7,849  | 32.5%  |
| Mario Fuenzalida (CD) | 6,762  | 28.0%  |
| Total                 | 24,152 | 100.0% |

The dust had not yet begun to settle following the defeat of the *Frente* in Curicó before Julio Durán resigned as the candidate of the government coalition, which completely disintegrated. Durán returned to Santiago, talked to Gabriel González Videla, the former president who was heading the *Frente* organization, and by late afternoon on March 16, the day after the Curicó election, he had revealed to the press that he had resigned as a candidate.<sup>22</sup> Durán's withdrawal showed the fundamental weakness of an alliance of a middle-of-the-road Radical Party, eager to appeal to the mass of voters now swinging leftward, with the right-wing Conservative and Liberal parties identified with the business and landowning classes.

The startling defeat of the *Frente* by the FRAP confounded the parties of the right, and they spent the next few weeks in a bewildered search for the proper course to follow. There was, again, the same talk of the possibility of a constitutional amendment to allow the presidential incumbent, Jorge Alessandri, to run for re-election. Although this device had been discussed before, it had never been very seriously considered; nor was it given serious consideration after the Curicó election. No doubt the known reluctance of Alessandri to acquiesce in the adoption of such a constitutional amendment,

<sup>19</sup> *El Mercurio*, March 2, 1964, p. 17.

<sup>20</sup> *El Mercurio*, March 11, 1964, p. 23.

<sup>21</sup> *El Mercurio*, March 13, 1964, p. 21.

<sup>22</sup> *El Mercurio*, March 17, 1964, p. 1.



something absolutely necessary for its success, was the primary factor in the failure of any real movement in this direction. All in all, the condition of the parties of the right, after Curicó, was a state of confusion, as they had been badly frightened by the efficient electoral machine fashioned by the FRAP in Curicó.

For their part, the Christian Democrats could not have been happier over the results had they themselves won. They had joined the battle reluctantly, fearing that the expected victory of the *Frente* would help Durán and hurt Frei's chances in September. The effect of the election was precisely the opposite. It eliminated Durán as a serious candidate, and, as we shall see, assured Frei's victory in the subsequent presidential election.

In his letter of resignation, Durán maintained that he was withdrawing his name in order to facilitate the *Frente's* search for solutions that would permit the defense of democracy and liberty.<sup>23</sup> Durán was praised for his forthrightness in resigning after his repudiation in Curicó,<sup>24</sup> but he was also criticized for acting so precipitously. Nevertheless, the Liberals and Conservatives recognized that Durán's candidacy was a lost cause. The Radical Party was also convinced that Durán could not win the presidency, but on March 18 the *Consejo Ejecutivo Nacional* (National Executive Council—CEN) of the PR voted to maintain Durán's candidacy and indicated an intention to fight the election alone.<sup>25</sup> This decision was not accepted by all Radicals. Some were very seriously interested in having the party enter officially into the coalition of parties backing Allende. This group was probably best represented in the CEN by Aníbal Palma, a young leftist. Following the debacle at Curicó, an attempt was made to organize a movement within the Radical Party capable of pushing its leadership to the left and into a coalition with Allende. Such a move would not have been out of keeping with the history of the Radical Party; as indicated above, their strength (and their weakness) has been in their capacity to form and reform alliances with political elements to their right and left. A key person in the maneuverings of the Radicals at this time was Senator Luis Bossay, the Radicals' presidential candidate in 1958. Bossay presents the general public image of a center-leftist reformer, and he would necessarily have had to go along with any move to develop an agreement with Allende at this point. The CEN had convoked a meeting of the party's National Assembly for April 4 in order to resolve the problem of the position of the Radical Party in the election.<sup>26</sup> The younger leftist Radicals wished to precipitate a real battle for an Allende coalition within the Assembly, but they needed the cooperation and leadership of certain leftist Radical leaders, particularly Bossay. A meeting was eventually held at Bossay's residence which was attended by a number of *Allendista* Radicals and certain major leaders of the parties of the FRAP. At the meeting Bossay expressed

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *El Mercurio*, March 18, 1964, p. 1.

<sup>26</sup> *El Mercurio*, March 20, 1964, p. 23.

his interest, sympathy, and support for what this group was trying to do. Further, he was optimistic about their chances. He announced, however, he had been planning for some time to go abroad on a world tour, was particularly interested in visiting the Communist Bloc countries, and would not be in Chile when the Assembly met in April. With this declaration, it became apparent that there would be no leftist revolt against the Radical leadership in the Assembly and that if Allende wanted Radical support he would have to deal with those leaders around Julio Durán, for they were firmly in control of the party machinery. The leftist Radicals soon left the party and formed the Radical Doctrinary Party (*Partido Radical Doctrinario*) to support the candidacy of Allende.

While it was clearly apparent that no revolt was going to unseat the Radical leadership, it was not clear to this leadership which of the several courses of action that presented themselves would be the most advantageous. Their alternatives were, logically, three: to support Allende, to enlist in Frei's forces, or to maintain the candidacy of Durán and fight the election alone. The immediate task was to disentangle the party from the government coalition that was seen as repudiated in the Curicó election. This was done quickly. On March 19, the CEN dissolved their pact with the *Frente Democrático* and broke all formal relations with the Alessandri government.<sup>27</sup> The next day, the CEN ordered all Radicals holding political appointments with the government to renounce their posts.<sup>28</sup> Thus, when the National Assembly of the party met in early April, the Radicals were free to follow any course they chose. Although there is no need to present here a detailed description of the composition of the Assembly, it should be pointed out that this body is heavily weighted in favor of the party bureaucracy and the congressional delegation. Without a real split within this group, any attempt to change the party leadership drastically is foredoomed. A number of factors influenced the Assembly to vote heavily in favor of the candidacy of Durán. To begin with, the leaders felt that the party was still quite strong in the country and that, if it could rid itself of the stigma of identification with the Alessandri government, Durán would be able to poll a respectable vote running alone. Since in early April it looked as if no one would be able to obtain an absolute majority of the vote in September with Durán in the race, the election, the Radicals expected, would be thrown into the Congress and that that body would then have the responsibility of choosing between the top two candidates. With the Radicals holding a combined total of 50 seats in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, the Radicals would, in fact, exercise the balance of power to decide between Frei and Allende. In such an advantageous position there would be very little doubt that the Radicals would then figure very actively in the subsequent government of either candidate. It is important

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<sup>27</sup> *El Mercurio*, March 21, 1964, p. 1.

<sup>28</sup> *El Mercurio*, March 22, 1964, p. 39. In spite of this order, no Radicals were known to have relinquished their posts. Resignations, as they were turned in, were kept in the desks of the various department heads.



to note that if the Radicals had committed themselves to one or the other of the leading candidates before the election, they would have narrowed the field (many felt that Jorge Prat too would soon abandon his candidacy), rendered it inevitable that one of the candidates could receive an absolute majority, and thus eliminated the role of Congress in the process of presidential selection. So, for many Radicals, the question was whether the party would be in a better bargaining position before or after the election. By sticking with Durán, the Assembly cast its vote for the latter strategy.

There were other elements, too, in the Radicals' decision to maintain an independent candidacy. The party has long advocated a stand—sometimes strong, sometimes mild, but always present—in favor of a careful separation of church and state. This tradition, closely identified with the characteristic freemasonry of many Radicals, disposed Radicals in general to look askance at Frei and the Christian Democrats. As the campaign progressed after April, certain overtures to one another were made on the part of both the Radicals and the Christian Democrats, but these came to naught. On the other hand, the militantly anti-Communist stand maintained consistently by Durán drove a wedge between him and Allende so that negotiations in that direction were strained at best. For these diverse reasons the Radical Party planned to maintain an independent candidate and hoped for the best in September.

The six weeks following the Curicó election were a busy period for the Liberal and Conservative parties also. They were confronted with several grave problems. There was no doubt that their policy line had been repudiated in Curicó, and the indications were that this rejection would be reiterated by the entire country in September if the parties stood alone. With Durán in headlong flight away from them, and Allende's policies an anathema, they were left with only two choices, neither of them pleasant. First, they could turn to the fourth candidate, Jorge Prat, and hope that his policy echoes of Carlos Ibáñez would stir the newly registered masses to vote for his brand of quasi-fascist nationalism. Prat, however, was something of an unknown quantity, despite his long campaign and prominent position in Chilean political life. In his campaign speeches he had often railed against the power of the industrialists and other large economic interests. Since the members of the directorates of the Liberal and Conservative parties were themselves the representatives of such interests, one can see why these parties were hesitant to place much confidence in Prat. Then, also, there was no indication that he could come anywhere near winning the presidency were the Liberals and Conservatives to give him their support. There was the very real possibility, too, that if Prat got the backing of the traditional Chilean right wing, he might divert so many votes from Frei and Durán that Allende would become the clear winner, a possibility made all the more probable by the Curicó defeat.

The only choice left, then, was to back Eduardo Frei, but there were serious problems for the Liberals and Conservatives surrounding the possibility of throwing their support to Frei. To begin with, Frei was himself

distasteful to many Liberals and Conservatives, for his constant attacks on the Alessandri government had long ago earned him their enmity. It was an open secret that President Alessandri strongly disliked Frei. The general feeling among administration supporters was that Frei, as a senator, had constantly opposed the Alessandri administration for opportunistic reasons and thus had been a major obstacle to the governmental measures that they saw as progressive. Evidence of this animosity is the vigorous opposition of such figures as the former president of the Liberal Party, Senator Gregorio Amunátegui, and Senator Eduardo Alessandri, brother of the president, to the endorsement of Frei which the Liberal Party finally decided to give. The Conservative Party shortly followed suit. The Conservatives threw their support to Frei because, like the Liberals, they literally had nowhere else to go.<sup>29</sup>

The terms of the accord between Frei and the Liberal and Conservative parties were interesting. There was no formal agreement that obligated the Christian Democrats to make any concessions to those parties in the event of Frei's election. It is possible, however, to discern a shift in propaganda by the Christian Democrats after the Curicó election, when they recognized the dilemma of the Right; they became more outspokenly anti-Communist. In a meeting of the major Christian Democratic leaders at Millahue in the middle of April, a general policy declaration was adopted which maintained the reformist attitude of the party but also averred that now only two roads presented themselves to Chile: that of Allende, which is to communism, and that of Frei, which is to liberty. The comment was offered that "the people must declare themselves" for the revolution in liberty of Frei, or the communist revolution of Allende. No other alternative, it was added, exists.<sup>30</sup> Liberal and Conservative party leaders reacted favorably to the statement. Shortly thereafter the leaders of the three parties held a series of meetings, as a result of which both the Liberal and Conservative parties gave their official support to Frei. Thereupon, Jorge Prat withdrew his candidacy. By the beginning of May, the transformation of the electoral campaign begun in mid-March was almost complete.<sup>31</sup> Whereas the campaign had once looked like a four-way race with Durán as the favorite, Allende and Frei as close contenders, and Prat as a poor fourth, it was now transformed into a two-way race between Allende and Frei, with Durán in the role of an also-ran.

Despite the vote of confidence from the *Asamblea Nacional* of the Radical Party, Durán was still reluctant to leave his followers in a position in which they would be subjected to a disastrous defeat. Radical candidates running alone had come in a poor third in the presidential campaign of 1952 and an even poorer fourth in that of 1958. Durán was faced with the problem of

<sup>29</sup> *Ercilla*, April 29, 1964, pp. 8-10.

<sup>30</sup> *Ercilla*, April 22, 1964, p. 8; and *El Mercurio*, April 21, 1964, p. 27. For other comments on the situation at this time see: *Clarín*, April 19, 1964 (pro-Allende); *Las Noticias de Última Hora*, April 21, 1964, p. 16 (pro-Allende); *El Siglo*, April 21, 1964, p. 3 (pro-Allende), and *Diario Ilustrado*, April 21, 1964, p. 4 (far-right journal, soon to support Frei).

<sup>31</sup> *Ercilla*, April 29, 1964, pp. 4-5.



continuing an expensive and arduous campaign with virtually no hope of eventually closing the gap between himself and the two front-runners. As with any candidate whose chances are bleak, Durán was having difficulty raising money to meet both past campaign debts and future expenditures. Consequently, when he was approached in early May by Allende supporters who were eager to effect some bargain that would gain their candidate the support of the Radicals, he listened closely to their proposals. At this point, there is little doubt that a Durán endorsement of Allende might have been decisive in the election. Durán's record of militant anti-communism would have blunted the communism issue and rendered it a much less effective weapon for Frei and his Liberal and Conservative allies.

Inasmuch as the Allende-Durán negotiations were shrouded in great secrecy, it is difficult to determine what actually took place, but, supposedly, the terms of an accord between Durán and Allende were worked out by Socialist Senator Salomón Corbalán and the Radical leader, Luis Alberto Cuevas. Durán was reported to have asked for several specific concessions that Allende was inclined to grant.<sup>32</sup> These were:

- 1) Allende's support as president for a reform of the electoral laws allowing for a return to the electoral pacts;
- 2) A guarantee that Radicals would be supported for the presidencies of both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies after the 1965 congressional elections;
- 3) The appointment of Radicals to the Ministries of Defense and Interior;
- 4) Support for a reform to make presidential and congressional elections coincident.

The rationale behind these particular terms seemed to be the following: First, a return to the electoral pacts that so encouraged the proliferation of parties would add to the president's difficulty in organizing support in a Congress whose parties might be further splintered by such a law. In such a situation the Radicals, the congressional party *par excellence*, would certainly benefit. The second provision would further guarantee the congressional power of the Radicals. The third agreement would assure Radical control of both the Armed Forces and the *Carabineros*, Chile's large and efficient police force, so that the possibilities of a *coup d'état* by Communists in Allende's government would be minimized. The last agreement, to support the holding of presidential and congressional elections on the same date, seems at first a strange provision. In the past, the power of Congress against the executive was often enhanced by their separate election. Congress and the president frequently represented different public opinions on various issues, and the president was unable to carry his supporters into office on his coattails. Notwithstanding all this, the hope of the Radicals was that they would be able to repeat their performance of 1938, when they captured the leadership of the Popular Front from elements further to the left. If the Radicals could

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<sup>32</sup> *Ercilla*, May 13, 1964, pp. 8-9.

have "elected" Allende and played the leading policy-role in his government, they might well have expected to have the next presidential candidate of the leftist forces selected from their ranks. In such a case, a Radical presidential candidate might have carried many Radical candidates into Congress in 1970.

As these factors are examined, it becomes obvious that the Radicals had much to gain by a Durán-Allende pact along the above lines. Another element that was rumored but, naturally, was never confirmed was that part of the agreement with Allende would be the assumption of the campaign debts of Durán by the FRAP. In Chilean politics such arrangements are not unknown, to say the least.

One concession demanded by Durán was reported to be the exclusion of the Communists from the subsequent Allende government.<sup>33</sup> It was obvious that any such agreement would have immediately demolished the FRAP, so Allende could not have given such a guarantee, even had he wished, which did not seem to be the case. According to rumor, the matter remained vague, as Durán understood Allende's situation, and a general agreement was reported to be imminent.

At this early date, the leftist newspapers took the pact as an accomplished fact and announced it as such. What happened to destroy the accord between Allende and Durán, if it ever existed, is not at all clear, but certain facts are known. First, among many sources, it is generally conceded that one afternoon the agreement was ready for signing, and the next morning Durán backed out. During the intervening period, Durán held an important interview with Eduardo Frei, in which it was reported that he was told that, while Frei was in no position to give concessions to the Radicals for their support at that time, since he had given none to the Liberals and Conservatives, the Radicals could expect to be called into the government after the March, 1965, congressional elections.<sup>34</sup> For the Christian Democrats, it was almost equally profitable for Durán to maintain his candidacy and not support Allende as for him to resign in favor of Frei. It would have been difficult for Durán, in any case, to carry the Radicals to Frei without badly splitting the party. At this point the vote in the CEN, as reported in the press, was ten in favor of maintaining Durán's candidacy to the end, six for going over to Allende, and five undecided.<sup>35</sup>

Another possible factor was an interview with Joseph J. Jova, Deputy Chief of Mission of the United States Embassy, that Durán is said to have had the same day as the Frei meeting. Whether or not this interview took place and what its influence on Durán might have been are, of course, both matters for conjecture. Nevertheless, on the morning following the supposed meeting, Durán rejected the pact with Allende. Suddenly, at a meeting of the party's *Asamblea Nacional* on May 9, Durán announced his intention of

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> *Ercilla*, May 20, 1964, p. 9.



staying in the race until the end. Although his statement was followed by serious commotion on the floor of the Assembly, Durán's decision was supported by a heavy vote. What happened is a matter for speculation, of which needless to say, there was a considerable amount on the part of the leftist press.<sup>36</sup> For those who nurtured this rumor there was no doubt that between Frei and the United States Embassy Durán was pressured out of the pact with Allende and was amply rewarded for his trouble.

Few important changes took place in the campaign after May, and the propaganda on both sides increased in intensity and bitterness. However, the strategy of the Frei campaign underwent some interesting changes. Throughout the Alessandri presidency the FRAP and the Christian Democrats had often found themselves on the same side of policy issues. Rarely did the issue of anti-Communism have much pertinence to their relationship. Those who commonly appealed for public support by citing the dangers of Communism during that period had been generally identified with groups further to the right, which supported the Alessandri government. By mid-April, however, when the Christian Democrats were faced only with Allende as a serious candidate, they began to find a strong emphasis on anti-Communism more appealing, and this began to be reflected in their propaganda almost immediately. Frei himself avoided openly accusing Allende of Communism in his speeches, but the forces supporting him were not so careful. For the Christian Democrats the situation was ideal. Since there were no formal agreements between the Liberal and Conservative parties and the Christian Democrats, the propaganda machinery of the two rightist parties did not come directly under Frei's control, and Frei consistently maintained that he was not responsible for the more scurrilous and blatant attacks on Allende. Scenes of the Castro executions in Cuba began to appear in campaign posters throughout the country, and Chileans were constantly questioned by propaganda material as to whether or not they wanted Communism in Chile. A number of the posters struck most Chileans as humorous rather than politically effective. For example, one depicted Santa Claus to the left of a poster and a Soviet soldier to the right, with the legend beneath reading: "Who do you want to knock on your door this Christmas?" A more effective poster that appeared late in the campaign appealed to soccer enthusiasts by recalling the world championship game of 1962:<sup>37</sup>

**GOL DE CHILE**  
Chile 2 (Frei)  
USSR 1 (Allende)

The effectiveness of the attempt to identify Allende with Communism is reflected in his public statements, for he frequently defended himself against

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<sup>36</sup> *El Mercurio*, May 10, 1964, p. 41. Also *Clarín*, May 10, 1964, p. 16, and *La Tercera de la Hora*, May 10, 1964, p. 1. For Durán's statement see *El Mercurio*, May 11, 1964, p. 1. For examples of leftist reaction, see *El Siglo*, May 12, 1964, p. 3; *Clarín*, May 12, 1964, p. 3; and *Las Noticias de Última Hora*, May 13, 1964, p. 3.

<sup>37</sup> Frei was number two on the official ballot while Allende was number one. The score shown belonged to the football world championship game between the Soviet Union and Chile held in Santiago in 1962.

the charge throughout the campaign.<sup>38</sup> While he did not depart from his position of being anti-United States, pro-Cuba, and pro-Socialist, he stoutly maintained his independence from Communism. In the concluding section of this study we shall refer again to the question of anti-Communism in the campaign, for this was probably the most important factor in the Frei victory.

As the September 4 date drew near the campaign grew more heated. This was reflected in the highly partisan Chilean press. In addition to *El Siglo*, the Communist daily, Allende could count on the strong support of several high-circulation leftist newspapers; *Clarín* and *Ultima Hora* were chief among them. Frei, on the other hand, was supported by a wider range of newspapers, from the rightist *Diario Ilustrado* and the strongly conservative *El Mercurio*, to *Golpe* (a strongly partisan newspaper created by the defunct *Frente Democrático* to counter the widely circulated afternoon papers that favored the FRAP). The Chilean press has enjoyed a long tradition of freedom of expression, of which it can be justly proud, but this freedom does not guarantee objectivity. The general political position of each of the newspapers had a strong influence on its news coverage during this particular campaign. It became very common to invest a straightforward news story concerning a non-political matter with strong political overtones. For example, a news item reporting a shooting during a quarrel might carry the headline "Freista shoots Allendista." And the story itself would tend to reflect the political coloration of the paper's editorial policy. Even the highly respected *El Mercurio*, by almost any standards one of the leading newspapers in all of Latin America, was not immune to the campaign fever. The initials, FRAP, which stand for *Frente de Acción Popular*, became the *Frente Revolucionario de Acción Popular* in all of *Mercurio's* news reporting in the last six months of the campaign, and their famous cartoon feature "Perejil," a Chilean *roto* whose stock-in-trade had been wry comments on the foibles of Chilean society, became transformed into a political propaganda vehicle against the FRAP. Shortly after the election, *El Mercurio's* news stories returned to the correct title, *Frente de Acción Popular*, but at the time of this writing, "Perejil" has yet to reform.

Several occurrences added to the intensity of the campaign as it moved toward its close. The first of these took place on the floor of the Senate late in June when a Communist senator, Jaime Barros, delivered a bitter attack on the Catholic Church.<sup>39</sup> This speech could hardly have pleased Allende, for he had been making overtures to the reformist Catholics who were disillusioned with the collaboration between the Christian Democrats and the rightist parties and offended by the increasingly vitriolic anti-Communist *Freista* propaganda. There is little evidence to indicate that Barros was obeying a party directive in making the speech, although it has been hypothesized that the attack was meant to tie Allende's hands in his dealings with the anti-Frei Catholic groups.

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<sup>38</sup> *La Tercera de la Hora*, May 7, 1964, p. 1.

<sup>39</sup> *Diario de Sesiones del Senado*, Sesión 5a, el martes 23 de junio de 1964.



Barros had been ,at best, a difficult militant for the Communist Party, but on the following day, on party orders, he retracted much of what he had said. However, not long after the presidential election, Barros, while retaining his senatorial seat, broke with the Communist Party. Despite the Barros speech, Allende continued to press for the support of Catholic groups and made several attempts to meet with the reformist Archbishop of Santiago, Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez.

Another notable event possibly carrying some political consequence was the tragic death of Irene Frei de Cid, sister of Eduardo Frei and Christian Democratic *regidor* for Santiago, in an automobile accident. It is debatable whether sympathy for Frei increased his support in the election, but there is that possibility.

Another doubtful, but possible, effect on the campaign was the defection of the former president of the Liberal Party, Senator Gregorio Amunátegui, and a number of others from the party and their subsequent support of Allende.<sup>40</sup> Amunátegui, a Liberal who voted against the party decision to aid Frei, had never warmed to the Frei candidacy. In explanation of his act, many rumors are cited concerning Amunátegui's personal life. It well may be, however, that this judgment is merely a bad guess. Many expected Allende to win the election, and most of them were not overly fearful of the "Communist menace"; hence it may have been primarily a matter of wanting to side with the winner.

During the last weeks of the campaign there were persistent rumors that one or another of the noted Liberals and Conservatives was going over to Allende. One of these was the 1946 Conservative presidential candidate and former ambassador to Peru, Dr. Eduardo Cruz Coke. The reformist Left has generally thought Dr. Cruz Coke to be one of the more sympathetic members of the Right in Chile. It has been intimated that he was asked by Allende to serve as intermediary in arranging a meeting with Cardinal Silva Henríquez, and, although he declined the role, speculation concerning his possible support of Allende grew so strong that, eventually, the president of the Conservative Party felt constrained to issue a denial after consultation with Cruz Coke.<sup>41</sup>

Another common rumor was that the President of the Republic, Jorge Alessandri, would have preferred to see Allende elected president over Frei. Indeed, speculation that the President's brother, Senator Eduardo Alessandri, would throw his support to the FRAP candidate persisted until the day before the election,<sup>42</sup> when events proved them false. This is not to say, however, that the rumors were unfounded, for the personal antagonism felt by President Alessandri toward Frei was well known. Frei's frequent attacks on the Alessandri government had prompted the animosity of the President and of the Chilean upper class in general.

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<sup>40</sup> *El Mercurio*, August 18, 1964, p. 21; and *Ercilla*, August 26, 1964.

<sup>41</sup> *Las Noticias de La Última Hora*, August 22, 1964, pp. 8-9.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

During August, the Alessandri government chose to bow to the pressure of the United States and other American nations and break off relations with Cuba. Despite the strong identification of the Chilean Left with Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution, there were no demonstrations or public disturbances. There is no doubt that this lack of reaction can be attributed to the fears of the FRAP leadership that any such response would lend credence to the charge that an Allende government would be one of violence. This would, of course, have cost Allende votes. It is doubtful that the breaking of relations with Cuba had any appreciable effect on the outcome of the election. Voters likely to be swayed by such a matter had probably already decided which candidate they would support. It may be that, had there been a public outcry on the left against the move, some Chileans would have been influenced because of national pride, for few in Chile like to see their government overtly influenced by the United States. But any demonstration probably would have cost Allende more votes than it would have gained, inasmuch as the Christian Democrats and their allies were doing their best to make the Cuban revolution an issue in the campaign. The FRAP denounced the Alessandri move but continued to concentrate its major propaganda emphasis on the domestic ills of Chile.

The campaign closed with huge rallies in Santiago held by both candidates. Although the sizes of the groups at party rallies were disputed, it is safe to say that each candidate drew crowds of several hundred thousand. The mood of these crowds proved interesting in contrast. Allende is an excellent speaker who, after three presidential campaigns based on the same complex of ideas, has an excellent knowledge of reform and delivers discourses on it in relatively sober terms. The average North American visitor might have found an Allende rally surprising. Having been conditioned by the standard journalistic reports of Latin American politics, he might have expected to see in Allende the "rasping" demagogue that one North American news magazine termed him.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, it might be said that Frei's speeches were more obviously designed to arouse the enthusiasm of his listeners than were those of Allende, and the response of the Christian Democratic crowds was usually much more frenetic than that of the *Allendistas*. For example, in Allende's last major address of the campaign in the *Parque Cousiño*, both of these authors were struck by the soberness of the crowd, which might have been interpreted by a casual observer as a lack of enthusiasm. When Allende raised his hand, however, held up his index finger, and asked the crowd to pledge their support for the number one (the place he held on the ballot), virtually everyone in the crowd of several hundred thousand raised his hand to show his allegiance.

In contrast to the Allende crowds, the *Freista* rallies were often loud and boisterous. The last rally held by Frei in Santiago was probably no larger than the final Allende rally, but it was much more enthusiastic in its behavior.

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<sup>43</sup> *Time*, August 21, 1964, p. 21.



Possibly this can be explained by the tremendous emphasis placed on anti-Communism in the Frei campaign, so that Frei supporters were impelled as much by their fear of Allende as by their devotion to Frei. This sort of anxiety may well explain the enthusiasm of the *Freista* rallies. The supporters of Allende were voting for him in the face of the propaganda attack on his Communist leanings, and their soberness may have resulted from the fact that their decision to support him had been made in this light. Naturally, since about one-fourth of the Allende voters normally support Communist candidates in the congressional and municipal elections, this propaganda undoubtedly produced a negative reaction in some. These speculations, however, must remain as only that, since no accurate studies of public opinion are yet available with which to test such judgments.<sup>44</sup>

A matter of particular interest to political scientists is that of campaign finance. It is, frankly, impossible to assess this accurately in the recent campaign—or in any Chilean election, for that matter—as there is no enforceable requirement that such expenditures be systematically reported. It is clear that the 1964 presidential campaign was the most expensive in Chilean history, but the question of how expensive, as well as where the money came from, is unanswerable. There were many charges made on these subjects both during and after the campaign. It was alleged, naturally, that the money to finance Allende's campaign came from the Socialist bloc countries, probably by way of Cuba. On the other hand, it was also charged not only that had the United States government and United States enterprises in Chile contributed money to Frei, but that additional funds came to him from the Christian Democratic Party of West Germany. Probably there is some truth in both charges, but it is impossible to confirm them. It has, indeed, been argued that there was probably not enough money available in Chile to carry out such an expensive campaign. This is not to say that Chile does not have many wealthy citizens who are capable of contributing heavily to political campaigns. They exist, and they do contribute. There is considerable evidence, too, that contributions from these sources did not go solely to Frei. A number of well-to-do Chileans gave quietly to Allende to hedge their bets, in the event that Frei lost. Interestingly enough, Allende ended the campaign personally in debt to the *Banco de Chile* for a considerable amount of money borrowed for the campaign. A revealing insight into the nature of Chilean politics is provided by the fact that one of the most conservative institutions in Chile, one that would have been greatly altered had the FRAP won, was still willing to lend Allende money to campaign against it and its candidate. It is evident by their graciousness to Allende in the matter of paying off the debt after he lost the election that the directors of the *Banco de Chile* were not simply putting up money to protect themselves. It is impossible to state which of the campaign funds was the larger. The personal observation of the authors leaves the

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<sup>44</sup> Such a study has been conducted by the *Centro de Estudios Socio-Económicos de la Universidad de Chile* under the direction of Professor Eduardo Hamuy. As yet only some preliminary results of it are available.

impression that the Christian Democratic candidate was supported by more numerous campaign posters, radio spot announcements, and newspaper advertisements than the FRAP candidate. But how much more money was available to Frei than to Allende simply cannot be determined.

During the final weeks of the campaign the FRAP leadership became concerned that the Chilean military forces might intervene to prevent Allende's election. Whether this was merely a campaign ploy or a real fear is difficult to assess accurately. There is no doubt that the FRAP leaders were optimistic about Allende's chances of victory, which would seem to indicate that their visit to President Alessandri the week before the election to discuss the matter of intervention was not made for propaganda purposes alone. The fear of giving the Right an excuse for a *coup* was also probably important in the FRAP decision not to go to the streets when Alessandri broke relations with Cuba.<sup>45</sup>

For his part, President Alessandri demonstrated his firm determination that there should be no reason for either the FRAP or the Christian Democrats to criticize his government's impartiality in the election. Many precautions were taken after the election to secure the central sectors of Santiago where the chief governmental offices are located. The *commando nacional* of the FRAP was also flanked by *carabineros* during and after the election since it was located in an isolated section of Santiago. Similar precautions were planned for the Frei headquarters should they have become necessary. These measures were taken to avert the possibility that, in the event of a close election, the followers of one or the other candidate, or of both, might try to demonstrate in favor of their man. In that event, it was highly likely that the army, whose major responsibility was to maintain order during the electoral period, and the *carabineros* would have their hands full trying to control the situation. Since the outcome of the election was not close, there was no necessity for the security forces to be called into action.

Another indication of governmental impartiality was displayed the night before the election when a speech recorded by Juanita Castro, the sister of Fidel Castro who turned against her brother, was broadcast attacking Communism and Allende despite the prohibition of further electoral propaganda on the day before the election. Allende asked for, and obtained, permission from the government to speak on the radio in answer to Señorita Castro. There were protests by both the *Freistas* and Radicals, but few felt that the government had not acted properly in the matter.

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<sup>45</sup>*El Mercurio*, August 12, 1964.



## 6. The Pattern of the Election

The election itself was held without incident. Despite the fears of the leftist leaders, it was honest, and in almost every manner exemplary of the very best Chilean democratic traditions.

Elections are by secret ballot in Chile. At each polling place the names of not more than 300 voters are inscribed in a registry. Five names are chosen by lot from the registry, and these persons supervise the election, count the ballots, and make the official report. The ballot is printed by the government and is the same at each polling place throughout the country. The order in which the candidates appear on the ballot is chosen by lot. (In the presidential election Allende was first; Frei, second; and Durán, third. As was pointed out earlier, the various campaigns emphasized the candidate's number on the ballot.) Each ballot must be marked in a prescribed manner and folded in order to be valid. At each polling place it is the responsibility of the person who acts as president to see that the folding is properly completed before the ballot is slipped into the ballot box. One of the charges leveled at the FRAP by the Christian Democrats during the campaign was that they were putting out propaganda to the effect that a valid vote had to be marked with one line for Allende, two for Frei, and three for Durán. Of course, a ballot so marked for either of the latter two candidates would become invalid. The low number of voided ballots indicates that this was not a serious matter.

Immediately after the closing of the polls, the votes are counted, and there are legal provisions allowing poll watchers from each party to observe all aspects of this process. After the votes are tallied, the ballots, the results, and all other pertinent material are sealed in envelopes and delivered by the president of each polling place to the proper governmental officials. There are heavy legal penalties for any irregularity in these matters. It is possible for a president or a member of the supervising board of a polling place to find himself faced with a possible jail sentence because of an honest error in calculation or a mistake in the procedures followed.

The 1964 presidential election was a model; there were virtually no incidents in all of Chile. This was partially because of the desire of the FRAP to maintain its position of democratic respectability at all costs. As long as there were prospects for a FRAP victory, there were many reasons for continuing this policy. Soon after the polls closed, the great size of the Frei victory became apparent, and there was no further reason for street demonstrations as there might have been in the event of a close election.

Eduardo Frei achieved what no other Chilean president in this century had done—he won an absolute majority of the vote. His victory was national, for he led the balloting in 19 of Chile's 25 provinces. Some 2,530,697 Chilean voters went to the polls and only 12.65 percent of those registered failed to vote.

Frei received 56.1 percent of the vote (1,409,012 votes), Allende trailed him with 38.9 percent (977,902 votes), and Durán placed a very poor third with 5 per cent (125,233 votes).

Frei cut heavily into Allende's usual strongholds for his great victory, and Allende barely managed to carry the northern mining provinces of Tarapacá, Antofagasta, and Atacama. He held a narrow margin of slightly more than 7,000 votes (out of some 168,000) over Frei in Concepción, where he was expected to run far ahead, and with Arauco, adjacent to Concepción, and with Magallanes he completed his total of six provinces. Frei ran far ahead in Santiago, where almost one-fifth of the votes in the country were cast. The Santiago totals were: 60.9 percent (620,489) for Frei, 35.7 percent (363,855) for Allende, and only 3.4 percent (34,727) for Durán. In Valparaíso, Allende's home district, where he was expected to do well, he ran some 65,000 behind out of slightly over 260,000 votes.

To sum up, Frei won the election everywhere and Allende lost it everywhere. To win, Allende needed to narrow the gap between candidates in Santiago and Valparaíso, to win heavily in Concepción, to do well in the rural areas, and to hold the Left's traditional edge in the mining provinces of the north. But he was unable to do any of these things. He lost heavily to Frei in Santiago and Valparaíso, won narrowly in Concepción and the northern provinces, and lost the rural areas, albeit by a narrow margin in some cases.

An interesting question to which there is no ready answer is whether Frei's overwhelming victory could be interpreted as an eclipse of the FRAP's political power and future domination of Chilean politics by the Christian Democrats. If a political party in the United States were defeated by so large a majority, it would certainly mean that the party was in serious trouble (as the 1964 defeat of Goldwater meant for the Republican Party) and that the winning party could afford to view the future with considerable confidence. It must be remembered, however, in assessing the vote in the 1964 Chilean presidential election that, despite the tendency to move into blocs, the political system continues to employ a multi-party pattern. Also, the forces that supported Frei did so for a number of reasons, and many of them had little to do with the program he was espousing. Indeed, as shown above, it can be said that both the Liberal and Conservative parties have strongly opposed the reform measures that Frei proposed in the past. The power available to Frei that came from these sectors during the campaign is not readily convertible into long-range support for the Christian Democratic Party. (This was amply demonstrated in the congressional opposition to Frei's program immediately after the election.) Now, however, Frei has the weight of the presidency on his side, with all its patronage and influence, and this is extremely important. At present, the Christian Democrats are rising in power, and just how long they will be able to maintain this trend is directly related to how well they can implement their program in the face of opposition from both the FRAP and their former allies, the Liberals and Conservatives. The increasing power



of the Christian Democrats has recently been assured by the congressional election of March, 1965, in which their spectacular victory secured Frei and his supporters a comfortable majority.

On the other hand, can it be said that the 1964 presidential elections signified an absolute catastrophe for Allende and the FRAP? Allende's support was probably such that he could have counted on it had he been running against only Frei or against a field of several serious candidates. Also, if the Curicó incident had never occurred and the Liberals, Conservatives, and Radicals had not broken their alliance in the *Frente Democrático*, it might have been a close race indeed. Without the Curicó episode, the money and effort that the Chilean right devoted to the Frei campaign would have been diverted to Durán, and the anti-Communist issue would not have been so clear-cut as it was in the two-way race. Second-guessing in such matters, however, is at best dangerous. It has been suggested that had the FRAP not accepted the challenge of the *Frente* and transformed the *Curicó* election into a "plebiscito" (plebiscite), thus engineering the assassination of the *Frente Democrático*, Allende might have won the election in September. In answer to the charge that "the FRAP won a deputy and lost a president,"<sup>1</sup> Allende is quoted as saying that he had enough money to carry on a real campaign in Curicó, but he needed a great deal more to win in September, and that if the FRAP did very well in Curicó he would get the contributions necessary for the rest of the campaign. Thus, it is very difficult to estimate what might have happened without the event in Curicó.

In the matter of the relative strength of FRAP in 1964, in comparison to 1958, for example, it must be said that the FRAP has generally managed to hold its own with the growth of the Chilean electorate. The pattern of growth, however, is uneven, as is shown in a recent analysis by Professor Hugo Zemelman Merino of the *Instituto de Planificación* of the University of Chile.<sup>2</sup> Professor Zemelman, writing in *Arauco*, a leading socialist journal, has found that, despite Allende's failure to gain the presidency, the FRAP did better in 1964, in over-all terms, than in 1958, and he sees this fact as directly related to increases in the five major types of geographic areas. Professor Zemelman, basing his discussions on electoral data (whose analytical limitations he admits), concludes that the FRAP enhanced its voting appeal in the following manner:

TABLE 6.—Vote for Allende in Selected Communes, 1958 and 1964<sup>3</sup>

| Type of Area           | 1958 | 1964 | % Increase |
|------------------------|------|------|------------|
| Pobladores (slums)     | 40%  | 44%  | 10%        |
| Working class (miners) | 46%  | 51%  | 11%        |
| Large urban centers    | 27%  | 36%  | 33%        |
| Small urban centers    | 27%  | 37%  | 37%        |
| Rural areas            | 26%  | 41%  | 58%        |

<sup>1</sup> *Ercilla*, September 9, 1964, p. 11; and December 30, 1964, p. 26.

<sup>2</sup> "Problemas ideológicos de la Izquierda," *Arauco*, No. 58, Año V (noviembre de 1964), pp. 50-60.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.

It can be seen that the Allende support increased most in those areas in which he made a poor showing in 1958 and increased least in the areas where he was strongest. The crux of the problem was that, despite Allende's generally improved showing in the rural areas, the increase in support was not nearly great enough to overcome the combination of traditional pressure from the *fundo* owners and Frei's promise of agrarian reform. In the most typically rural areas that Professor Zemelman selected for his analysis, Allende's support increased by 58 percent, but Frei managed to win in 17 of the 20 communes selected. Thus, Allende was unable to win (much less win heavily, as he would have had to do to carry the election) even in the rural areas where he attracted the greatest percentage of the new voters registered.

Professor Zemelman's figures show also that, in the urban centers and the *pobladores* that border them, Allende was able to attract a slightly higher percentage of voters in 1964 than he had in 1958, but he came nowhere near winning a majority in any of these areas. Indeed, in the important lower- and working-class commune of San Miguel in Santiago, an area won by Allende in 1958 (55 percent) and conceded to him by most observers in 1964, Frei received an absolute majority of the vote.

The importance of the female vote is evident in the examination of the 1964 election returns. Political analysts are afforded a convenient means of assessing the effect of this aspect of Chilean elections since men and women vote separately. It is clear that, while Frei obtained a majority of the vote among Chilean men, he was also overwhelmingly supported by Chilean women. There is no doubt that Chilean women were strongly influenced by both Frei's strong Catholicism and Allende's Marxian arguments. The fear of the latter probably strengthened the appeal of the former, and Frei obtained 63 percent of the female votes.

To conclude, the pattern of Frei's great victory was that of a national triumph. He was strongly supported in all areas of the country. In those sections in which he trailed Allende he was not far behind, and in a number of communes he was the overwhelming choice of the voters.

Durán, with his 125,233 votes (5 percent) trailed both candidates in all sections of the country. As has been observed earlier, he was left with a humiliating defeat and, because of Frei's absolute majority, could not even bargain with the Radical congressional votes as he might have done had Frei obtained only a relative majority.



## 7. Conclusion

What, then, were the most important factors contributing to the great and unprecedented victory for Eduardo Frei in the 1964 Chilean presidential election?

First and foremost was certainly the issue of Communism, and this contention is amply supported in two ways. First, there was the role of Communism in the Chilean Right's decision to throw its support to Frei after the Curicó debacle. Had the Communist issue not existed, the Liberals and Conservatives probably would not have been so alarmed by their defeat in this by-election. Later, in May, the position on Communism was also important in Durán's decision to stay in the race instead of going over to Allende.

The second aspect of the Communist controversy was its effectiveness as a campaign weapon against Allende. This matter was drummed persistently into the consciousness of the Chilean electorate, and there is no doubt of its great effect. While the more blatant propaganda was laughed off in typical Chilean fashion, one must believe that even this left its mark. Allende was constantly on the defensive concerning this issue and found it necessary, as discussed earlier, to protest the charge of Communism. Defeat left the FRAP in a very bitter mood, and it denounced the "campaign of terror" that had driven voters to Frei through "fear." This assertion may contain more than a grain of truth. The fact is that many voters were so frightened before the election that they laid in a week's supply of food in case of riots or other political upsets that might be attendant on a FRAP victory. Another indication of this anxiety was the fact that airline reservations were booked out of Chile for several months after the elections as a hedge against a FRAP victory. When people are prepared to leave their country because they have supported a losing political candidate, it is safe to say that they are indeed alarmed.

The second most important electoral factor, in our judgment, was the extraordinary appeal and attractiveness of Frei and his program. Although it was difficult to predict the outcome of the election beforehand, it is more difficult to see, from this vantage point of hindsight, how Frei could have been defeated. He was a reformer in a time when Chileans were in a strongly reformist mood; he had at his disposal a most effective political organization to run his campaign "como una empresa";<sup>1</sup> and he had the strong political and financial support of the Chilean Right, which was willing to spearhead the major issue of the campaign, anti-Communism. Thus, the theme "Revolution in Liberty" could deftly include leftists, anti-Communist reformers, middle-

---

<sup>1</sup> "Like a business." The Christian Democratic organization operated as a very effective and imaginative unit during the campaign. For example, a dramatic "March of Patriotic Youth" was organized which began at the extreme end of the country and continued in relays until it reached Santiago. Also, for the first time in a Chilean campaign, extensive use of public opinion polls was seen. The Christian Democrats employed two separate polling organizations during the campaign to keep a running check on how they were faring.

of-the-road go-slow democrats, and *status quo* conservatives who hoped that the aspects of liberty in the slogan would receive stronger emphasis than the revolutionary ones. Frei became the overwhelming choice of the reformist-oriented middle class. Despite the strong tradition of anti-Church feeling among members of this group, Frei summed up their aspirations. These people are democrats, liberals, and economic nationalists, and they generally accept a strong measure of state control of the economy. The pattern of election returns from middle-class urban districts confirm their support of Frei.

These two factors, the Communist issue and the personality and program of Frei, go a very long way toward explaining the results of the 1964 Chilean presidential election.

In broader terms, what was the significance of the election for the Chilean political system? First of all, the long and heated campaign had a strengthening effect on national political integration. As was pointed out earlier, over one-half of those voting in the 1964 election had never before voted for a Chilean president. There is no doubt that this election was a powerful catalyst in the process of altering the pattern of political socialization and recruitment in Chile. Furthermore, the fact that nearly one and one-half million voters (both old and new) supported Frei certainly portended well for the future of Christian Democrats. Such auguries were more than fulfilled when six months later, through another remarkable victory in the March, 1965, congressional elections, the party won 82 out of 147 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 13 Senatorial seats out of 20, thus becoming the majority party, a feat not achieved in a century in the traditionally multi-party system of Chile.

Despite the role played by the 1964 election in the national political integration of Chile, there are large gaps that have yet to be filled in. It is true that almost every voter in Chile had at least one opportunity to see one or both of the major presidential candidates during the long campaign, and for many people, particularly those in rural areas, it was the first time that a politician had come before them to discuss national political issues seriously. This fact alone betokens an important alteration in the political behavior of Chileans. The mere act of voting, however, while it is a first step, does not necessarily indicate that intermediary structures are being created that will be capable of bringing effective pressure on the political decision-makers during the long years between elections. At present, for example, there is not one organization that can be accurately described as an interest group capable of representing the demands of the Chilean *campesino*, even on a regional basis. Furthermore, there is still considerable resistance to the formation of such groups by the economically powerful groups in Chile. The emphasis of Frei's program on the *Promoción Popular*, designed to integrate the urban and rural poor into effective political roles, indicates that the Christian Democrats are aware that such intermediary structures can be an important source of strength for the party in the future. At present, however, they simply do not exist.



The political future of Chile depends on the amount of external support given the Frei government. Naturally, most of this aid must come from the United States, but the international character of the Christian Democratic ideology has struck a responsive chord in Europe as well, and there are particularly close ties between the Christian Democratic Parties of Chile and of the Federal Republic of Germany. As mentioned earlier, there were persistent rumors of an infusion of money into the Frei campaign from German sources. There seems to be more than a little truth in these allegations, some of which had their origins in Germany. The question of the veracity of these rumors aside, there is no doubt that Frei is likely to draw much more heavily upon European sources for development capital than any of his predecessors ever did.

With sufficient aid forthcoming from foreign sources (and so far the response has been favorable) and now with ample support in Congress for its program of reform, the Christian Democratic government may well make Chile an example for all of Latin America. In the first few months of his administration virtually all of Frei's reform measures were blocked by congressional intransigence from both the far Left and the far Right, but the Christian Democrats' victory in 1965 saved President Frei, the overwhelming choice of Chilean voters in September, 1964, from an agonizingly frustrating five and one-half more years of office with an obstructionist Congress.







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**ICOPS**

## **THE CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF SEPTEMBER 4, 1964**

### **Part II**

**1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RETURNS, BROKEN DOWN BY  
SEX, PROVINCE, AND REGION, ALONG WITH  
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RETURNS, OF 1952 AND 1958**

**INSTITUTE FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS**

**A DIVISION OF OPERATIONS & POLICY RESEARCH, INC.**

**WISCONSIN BUILDING, SUITE 505**

**4000 ALBEMARLE STREET, N.W.**

**WASHINGTON, D. C. 20018**







**ICOPS**

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## I

VOTING PARTICIPATION IN 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION  
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with Population and Electoral Registration
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TABLE 1

VOTING PARTICIPATION IN CHILEAN MUNICIPAL, CONGRESSIONAL, AND PRESIDENTIAL  
ELECTIONS — 1950-1964 — COMPARED WITH  
POPULATION AND ELECTORAL REGISTRATION

| Year | Type of Election | Population <sup>a</sup> | Registered Voters | Percentage of Population Registered | Votes Cast | Percentage of Registered Who Voted | Percentage of Population Who Voted |
|------|------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1964 | Presidential     | 7,954,066               | 2,895,165         | 36.40                               | 2,530,697  | 87.41                              | 31.82                              |
| 1963 | Municipal        | 7,735,990               | 2,570,291         | 33.22                               | 2,070,188  | 80.54                              | 26.76                              |
| 1961 | Congressional    | 7,394,187               | 1,858,980         | 25.14                               | 1,385,676  | 74.54                              | 18.74                              |
| 1960 | Municipal        | 7,243,971               | 1,769,681         | 24.43                               | 1,229,503  | 69.48                              | 16.97                              |
| 1958 | Presidential     | 6,984,507               | 1,497,902         | 21.45                               | 1,250,350  | 83.47                              | 17.90                              |
| 1957 | Congressional    | 6,738,699               | 1,284,154         | 19.06                               | 878,229    | 68.39                              | 13.03                              |
| 1956 | Municipal        | 6,588,483               | 1,184,882         | 17.98                               | 731,449    | 61.73                              | 11.10                              |
| 1953 | Municipal        | 6,083,211               | 1,106,709         | 18.19                               | 759,379    | 68.62                              | 12.48                              |
|      | Congressional    |                         | 1,100,027         | 18.08                               | 786,811    | 71.53                              | 12.93                              |
| 1952 | Presidential     | 6,001,275               | 1,105,029         | 18.41                               | 957,102    | 86.61                              | 15.95                              |
| 1950 | Municipal        | 5,773,859               | 833,460           | 14.44                               | 619,724    | 74.36                              | 10.73                              |

<sup>a</sup>Using 1940, 1952, and 1960 censuses various estimates of rate of population growth were made, and in each relevant instance, extrapolated to the year and month of the election.



TABLE 2  
MAP OF CHILE WITH BAR CHART  
OF 1960 POPULATION BY PROVINCE




TABLE 3

VOTING PARTICIPATION IN CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1964, COMPARED WITH  
POPULATION AND ELECTORAL REGISTRATION, AND BROKEN DOWN BY PROVINCE

| Province    | Estimated Population<br>September, 1964 <sup>a</sup> | Estimated Eligible<br>1964 Electorate <sup>b</sup> | Votes Cast,<br>1964 Pres.<br>Election | Percentage of<br>Population<br>Who Voted | Percentage of<br>Estimated Eligible<br>Electorate Who Voted |
|-------------|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| Tarapacá    | 131,350                                              | 66,145                                             | 51,897                                | 39.51                                    | 78.46                                                       |
| Antofagasta | 226,870                                              | 115,295                                            | 84,104                                | 37.07                                    | 72.95                                                       |
| Atacama     | 129,217                                              | 58,333                                             | 42,479                                | 32.87                                    | 72.82                                                       |
| Coquimbo    | 325,689                                              | 129,403                                            | 82,597                                | 25.36                                    | 63.83                                                       |
| Aconcagua   | 144,918                                              | 61,596                                             | 47,980                                | 33.11                                    | 77.89                                                       |
| Valparaíso  | 663,715                                              | 339,490                                            | 268,208                               | 40.41                                    | 79.00                                                       |
| Santiago    | 2,724,244                                            | 1,342,130                                          | 1,024,897                             | 37.62                                    | 76.36                                                       |
| O'Higgins   | 274,210                                              | 108,768                                            | 86,422                                | 31.52                                    | 79.46                                                       |
| Colchagua   | 166,124                                              | 57,233                                             | 42,059                                | 25.32                                    | 73.49                                                       |
| Curicó      | 114,900                                              | 42,088                                             | 28,944                                | 25.19                                    | 68.77                                                       |
| Talca       | 219,308                                              | 82,070                                             | 54,346                                | 24.78                                    | 66.22                                                       |
| Maule       | 82,409                                               | 31,383                                             | 22,662                                | 27.50                                    | 72.21                                                       |
| Linares     | 180,763                                              | 66,572                                             | 44,678                                | 24.72                                    | 67.11                                                       |
| Ñuble       | 299,006                                              | 109,935                                            | 71,725                                | 23.99                                    | 65.24                                                       |
| Concepción  | 592,836                                              | 260,587                                            | 168,220                               | 28.38                                    | 64.55                                                       |
| Arauco      | 96,591                                               | 33,022                                             | 20,506                                | 21.23                                    | 62.10                                                       |
| Bío-Bío     | 179,931                                              | 64,385                                             | 38,635                                | 21.47                                    | 60.01                                                       |
| Malleco     | 180,620                                              | 63,300                                             | 42,788                                | 23.69                                    | 67.60                                                       |
| Cautín      | 405,236                                              | 155,157                                            | 96,974                                | 23.93                                    | 62.50                                                       |
| Valdivia    | 264,919                                              | 75,534                                             | 65,895                                | 24.87                                    | 87.24                                                       |
| Osorno      | 153,090                                              | 64,059                                             | 39,005                                | 25.48                                    | 60.89                                                       |
| Llanquihue  | 177,299                                              | 72,551                                             | 40,674                                | 22.94                                    | 56.06                                                       |
| Aysén       | 41,810                                               | 16,971                                             | 9,649                                 | 23.08                                    | 56.86                                                       |
| Chiloé      | 97,762                                               | 41,424                                             | 23,039                                | 23.57                                    | 55.62                                                       |
| Magallanes  | 80,867                                               | 44,512                                             | 32,314                                | 39.96                                    | 72.60                                                       |
| TOTALS      | 7,954,066 <sup>c</sup>                               | 3,501,943                                          | 2,530,697                             | 31.82                                    | 72.26                                                       |

<sup>a</sup>Using 1952 and 1960 censuses, a population rate of growth was estimated for each province and extrapolated to September, 1964, the month of the election.

<sup>b</sup>Estimates of literates 21 and over in September, 1964.

<sup>c</sup>Total includes the Territorio Antártica (Antarctic Territory) of Chile.

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL PRESIDENTIAL VOTE  
BY PROVINCE, SEPTEMBER 4, 1964

| Province    | Percentage |
|-------------|------------|
| Tarapacá    | 2.04       |
| Antofagasta | 3.32       |
| Atacama     | 1.68       |
| Coquimbo    | 3.16       |
| Aconcagua   | 1.90       |
| Valparaíso  | 10.60      |
| Santiago    | 40.50      |
| O'Higgins   | 3.42       |
| Colchagua   | 1.66       |
| Curicó      | 1.44       |
| Talca       | 2.15       |
| Maule       | .90        |
| Linares     | 1.76       |
| Ñuble       | 2.83       |
| Concepción  | 6.64       |
| Arauco      | .81        |
| Bío-Bío     | 1.52       |
| Malleco     | 1.69       |
| Cautín      | 3.83       |
| Valdivia    | 2.59       |
| Osorno      | 1.54       |
| Llanquihue  | 1.60       |
| Aysén       | .38        |
| Chiloé      | .90        |
| Magallanes  | 1.28       |
| TOTAL       | 100.14*    |

\*Percentages are as calculated, and are not rounded out to equal 100%.



## II

## POLITICAL PARTY PARTICIPATION IN 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Table

- |   |                                                                                                   |
|---|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 5 | Glossary of National Political Parties Participating in the Chilean Presidential Election of 1964 |
| 6 | Party Support for Candidates in 1964 Presidential Election                                        |

TABLE 5

GLOSSARY OF NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES PARTICIPATING  
IN THE CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1964

| Party Name                               | Initials | Anglicized Name                    |
|------------------------------------------|----------|------------------------------------|
| Partido Conservador Unido                | PCU      | United Conservative Party          |
| Partido Liberal                          | PL       | Liberal Party                      |
| Partido Radical                          | PR       | Radical Party                      |
| Partido Demócrata Cristiano              | PDC      | Christian Democratic Party         |
| Partido Socialista                       | PS       | Socialist Party                    |
| Partido Comunista de Chile               | PCCh     | Communist Party of Chile           |
| Partido Democrático Nacional             | PADENA   | National Democratic Party          |
| Vanguardia Nacional del Pueblo<br>Pueblo | VNP      | National Vanguard of the<br>People |
| Partido Acción Nacional                  | PAN      | National Action Party              |

TABLE 6

PARTY SUPPORT FOR CANDIDATES  
IN 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

| <u>Candidate</u> | <u>Supporting Parties*</u>      |
|------------------|---------------------------------|
| Frei             | PDC, PCU, PL                    |
| Allende          | FRAP (PS, PCCh,<br>PADENA, VNP) |
| Durán            | PR                              |

\*It is not known whether the ninth party, the PAN, after the withdrawal of its presidential candidate, Jorge Prat, formally transferred its support to any other candidate.

## III

## DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL NATIONAL VOTE

Table

- 7 National Vote Distribution in Presidential Election of 1964
  - A. Gross Distribution of the Total Vote
  - B. Percentage Distribution of the Total Valid Vote
- 8 National Distribution of the Male Vote in the Presidential Election of 1964
  - A. Gross Distribution of the Total Male Vote
  - B. Percentage Distribution of the Total Male Valid Vote
- 9 National Distribution of the Female Vote in the Presidential Election of 1964
  - A. Gross Distribution of the Total Female Vote
  - B. Percentage Distribution of the Total Female Valid Vote



TABLE 7

## NATIONAL VOTE DISTRIBUTION IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1964

## 7-A

## Gross Distribution of the Total Vote

| Candidate | Votes     |
|-----------|-----------|
| Frei      | 1,409,012 |
| Allende   | 977,902   |
| Durán     | 125,233   |
| Null      | 11,479    |
| Blank     | 7,071     |
| TOTAL     | 2,530,697 |

## 7-B

## Percentage Distribution of the Total Valid Vote

| Candidate | Percentage of<br>Total Valid Vote |
|-----------|-----------------------------------|
| Frei      | 56.09                             |
| Allende   | 38.93                             |
| Durán     | 4.99                              |
| TOTAL     | 100.01*                           |

\*Percentages are as calculated, and are not rounded out to equal 100%.

TABLE 8

NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE MALE VOTE  
IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1964

8-A

## Gross Distribution of the Total Male Vote

| Candidate | Male Vote |
|-----------|-----------|
| Frei      | 652,895   |
| Allende   | 593,770   |
| Durán     | 68,071    |
| Null      | 6,801     |
| Blank     | 4,407     |
| TOTAL     | 1,325,944 |

8-B

## Percentage Distribution of the Total Male Valid Vote

| Candidate | Percentage of Total<br>Valid Male Vote |
|-----------|----------------------------------------|
| Frei      | 49.66                                  |
| Allende   | 45.16                                  |
| Durán     | 5.18                                   |
| TOTAL     | 100.00*                                |

\*Percentages are as calculated, and are not  
rounded out to equal 100%.

TABLE 9

NATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE FEMALE VOTE  
IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1964

## 9-A

## Gross Distribution of the Total Female Vote

| Candidate | Female Vote |
|-----------|-------------|
| Frei      | 756,117     |
| Allende   | 384,132     |
| Durán     | 57,162      |
| Null      | 4,678       |
| Blank     | 2,664       |
| TOTAL     | 1,204,753   |

## 9-B

## Percentage Distribution of the Total Female Valid Vote

| Candidate | Percentage of Total<br>Valid Female Vote |
|-----------|------------------------------------------|
| Frei      | 63.15                                    |
| Allende   | 32.08                                    |
| Durán     | 4.77                                     |
| TOTAL     | 100.00*                                  |

\*Percentages are as calculated, and not rounded  
out to equal 100%.



## IV

DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL NATIONAL VOTE,  
BROKEN DOWN BY PROVINCETable

- |    |                                                                                              |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 10 | Gross Distribution of the Total Vote in the Presidential Election of 1964 by Province        |
| 11 | Percentage Distribution of Total Valid Vote in the Presidential Election of 1964 by Province |
| 12 | Gross Distribution of the Total Male Vote in the Presidential Election of 1964 by Province   |
| 13 | Gross Distribution of the Total Female Vote in the Presidential Election of 1964 by Province |

TABLE 10

GROSS DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL VOTE IN THE  
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1964 BY PROVINCE

| Province    | Frei      | Allende | Durán   | Null   | Blank | Total     |
|-------------|-----------|---------|---------|--------|-------|-----------|
| Tarapacá    | 23,738    | 24,204  | 3,405   | 345    | 205   | 51,897    |
| Antofagasta | 38,007    | 40,209  | 5,072   | 538    | 278   | 84,104    |
| Atacama     | 18,256    | 18,796  | 5,086   | 203    | 138   | 42,479    |
| Coquimbo    | 37,546    | 36,916  | 7,317   | 500    | 318   | 82,597    |
| Aconcagua   | 26,188    | 19,255  | 2,203   | 180    | 154   | 47,980    |
| Valparaíso  | 160,506   | 96,094  | 9,689   | 1,184  | 735   | 268,208   |
| Santiago    | 620,489   | 363,855 | 34,727  | 3,623  | 2,203 | 1,024,897 |
| O'Higgins   | 44,046    | 39,170  | 2,636   | 324    | 246   | 86,422    |
| Colchagua   | 24,526    | 15,224  | 1,980   | 180    | 149   | 42,059    |
| Curicó      | 14,982    | 11,894  | 1,885   | 107    | 76    | 28,944    |
| Talca       | 27,367    | 24,439  | 2,151   | 239    | 150   | 54,346    |
| Maule       | 12,254    | 8,680   | 1,592   | 92     | 44    | 22,662    |
| Linares     | 23,725    | 18,495  | 2,092   | 195    | 171   | 44,678    |
| Ñuble       | 41,574    | 24,314  | 5,299   | 303    | 235   | 71,725    |
| Concepción  | 75,414    | 82,332  | 9,181   | 750    | 543   | 168,220   |
| Arauco      | 5,780     | 12,264  | 2,281   | 90     | 91    | 20,506    |
| Bío-Bío     | 20,202    | 14,682  | 3,317   | 245    | 189   | 38,635    |
| Malleco     | 23,850    | 15,490  | 3,086   | 234    | 128   | 42,788    |
| Cautín      | 60,542    | 29,957  | 5,635   | 584    | 256   | 96,974    |
| Valdivia    | 33,619    | 28,176  | 3,334   | 529    | 237   | 65,895    |
| Osorno      | 19,835    | 14,724  | 4,023   | 308    | 115   | 39,005    |
| Llanquihue  | 25,415    | 12,021  | 2,872   | 236    | 130   | 40,674    |
| Aysén       | 5,536     | 3,307   | 697     | 83     | 26    | 9,649     |
| Chiloé      | 12,170    | 7,384   | 3,043   | 281    | 161   | 23,039    |
| Magallanes  | 13,445    | 16,020  | 2,630   | 126    | 93    | 32,314    |
| TOTALS      | 1,409,012 | 977,902 | 125,233 | 11,479 | 7,071 | 2,530,697 |

TABLE 11

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL VALID VOTE IN THE  
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1964 BY PROVINCE

| Province    | Total Valid Vote | Candidate Percentage of<br>Total Valid Vote* |         |       |
|-------------|------------------|----------------------------------------------|---------|-------|
|             |                  | Frei                                         | Allende | Durán |
| Tarapacá    | 51,347           | 46.23                                        | 47.14   | 6.63  |
| Antofagasta | 83,288           | 45.63                                        | 48.28   | 6.09  |
| Atacama     | 42,138           | 43.32                                        | 44.61   | 12.07 |
| Coquimbo    | 81,779           | 45.91                                        | 45.14   | 8.95  |
| Aconcagua   | 47,646           | 54.96                                        | 40.41   | 4.62  |
| Valparaíso  | 266,289          | 60.27                                        | 36.09   | 3.64  |
| Santiago    | 1,019,071        | 60.89                                        | 35.70   | 3.41  |
| O'Higgins   | 85,852           | 51.30                                        | 45.63   | 3.07  |
| Colchagua   | 41,730           | 58.77                                        | 36.48   | 4.74  |
| Curicó      | 28,761           | 52.09                                        | 41.35   | 6.55  |
| Talca       | 53,957           | 50.72                                        | 45.29   | 3.99  |
| Maule       | 22,526           | 54.40                                        | 38.53   | 7.07  |
| Linares     | 44,312           | 53.54                                        | 41.74   | 4.72  |
| Ñuble       | 71,187           | 58.40                                        | 34.16   | 7.44  |
| Concepción  | 166,927          | 45.18                                        | 49.32   | 5.50  |
| Arauco      | 20,325           | 28.44                                        | 60.34   | 11.22 |
| Bío-Bío     | 38,201           | 52.88                                        | 38.43   | 8.68  |
| Malleco     | 42,426           | 56.22                                        | 36.51   | 7.27  |
| Cautín      | 96,134           | 62.98                                        | 31.16   | 5.86  |
| Valdivia    | 65,129           | 51.62                                        | 43.26   | 5.12  |
| Osorno      | 38,582           | 51.41                                        | 38.16   | 10.43 |
| Llanquihue  | 40,308           | 63.05                                        | 29.82   | 7.13  |
| Aysén       | 9,540            | 58.03                                        | 34.66   | 7.31  |
| Chiloé      | 22,597           | 53.86                                        | 32.68   | 13.47 |
| Magallanes  | 32,095           | 41.89                                        | 49.91   | 8.19  |
| TOTALS      | 2,512,147        | 56.09                                        | 38.93   | 4.99  |

\*Percentages are as calculated, and are not rounded out to equal 100%.



TABLE 12

GROSS DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL VALID MALE VOTE IN THE  
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1964 BY PROVINCE

| Province    | Frei    | Allende | Durán  | Null  | Blank | Total     |
|-------------|---------|---------|--------|-------|-------|-----------|
| Tarapacá    | 11,154  | 14,923  | 1,896  | 198   | 111   | 28,282    |
| Antofagasta | 18,452  | 25,574  | 2,881  | 286   | 137   | 47,330    |
| Atacama     | 9,351   | 12,600  | 2,847  | 114   | 83    | 24,995    |
| Coquimbo    | 17,536  | 23,240  | 4,059  | 309   | 194   | 45,338    |
| Aconcagua   | 12,208  | 12,106  | 1,177  | 100   | 107   | 25,698    |
| Valparaíso  | 69,150  | 55,523  | 4,933  | 611   | 429   | 130,646   |
| Santiago    | 266,805 | 207,538 | 17,859 | 1,799 | 1,238 | 495,239   |
| O'Higgins   | 20,656  | 23,774  | 1,463  | 185   | 148   | 46,226    |
| Colchagua   | 12,143  | 9,629   | 1,100  | 107   | 109   | 23,088    |
| Curicó      | 7,224   | 7,521   | 908    | 67    | 45    | 15,765    |
| Talca       | 12,534  | 15,133  | 1,117  | 151   | 105   | 29,040    |
| Maule       | 5,863   | 5,184   | 818    | 66    | 28    | 11,959    |
| Linares     | 11,270  | 11,606  | 1,165  | 146   | 109   | 24,296    |
| Ñuble       | 21,363  | 15,508  | 3,128  | 210   | 170   | 40,379    |
| Concepción  | 34,443  | 50,323  | 5,064  | 438   | 327   | 90,595    |
| Arauco      | 3,108   | 8,324   | 1,360  | 67    | 72    | 12,931    |
| Bío-Bío     | 11,724  | 10,531  | 1,924  | 204   | 146   | 24,529    |
| Malleco     | 12,848  | 10,547  | 1,724  | 159   | 98    | 25,376    |
| Cautín      | 34,523  | 20,326  | 3,064  | 460   | 196   | 58,569    |
| Valdivia    | 18,572  | 18,720  | 1,819  | 405   | 179   | 39,695    |
| Osorno      | 10,742  | 10,286  | 2,328  | 224   | 81    | 23,681    |
| Llanquihue  | 15,112  | 8,367   | 1,716  | 185   | 100   | 25,480    |
| Aysén       | 3,273   | 2,234   | 441    | 55    | 17    | 6,020     |
| Chiloé      | 6,405   | 4,390   | 1,767  | 170   | 116   | 12,848    |
| Magallanes  | 6,436   | 9,863   | 1,493  | 85    | 62    | 17,939    |
| TOTALS      | 652,895 | 593,770 | 68,071 | 6,801 | 4,407 | 1,325,944 |

TABLE 13

GROSS DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL FEMALE VOTE IN THE  
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1964 BY PROVINCE

| Province    | Frei    | Allende | Durán  | Null  | Blank | Total     |
|-------------|---------|---------|--------|-------|-------|-----------|
| Tarapacá    | 12,584  | 9,281   | 1,509  | 147   | 94    | 23,615    |
| Antofagasta | 19,555  | 14,635  | 2,191  | 252   | 141   | 36,774    |
| Atacama     | 8,905   | 6,196   | 2,239  | 89    | 55    | 17,484    |
| Coquimbo    | 20,010  | 13,676  | 3,258  | 191   | 124   | 37,259    |
| Aconcagua   | 13,980  | 7,149   | 1,026  | 80    | 47    | 22,282    |
| Valparaíso  | 91,356  | 40,571  | 4,756  | 573   | 306   | 137,562   |
| Santiago    | 353,684 | 156,317 | 16,868 | 1,824 | 965   | 529,658   |
| O'Higgins   | 23,390  | 15,396  | 1,173  | 139   | 98    | 40,196    |
| Colchagua   | 12,383  | 5,595   | 880    | 73    | 40    | 18,971    |
| Curicó      | 7,758   | 4,373   | 977    | 40    | 31    | 13,179    |
| Talca       | 14,833  | 9,306   | 1,034  | 88    | 45    | 25,306    |
| Maule       | 6,391   | 3,496   | 774    | 26    | 16    | 10,703    |
| Linares     | 12,455  | 6,889   | 927    | 49    | 62    | 20,382    |
| Ñuble       | 20,211  | 8,806   | 2,171  | 93    | 65    | 31,346    |
| Concepción  | 40,971  | 32,009  | 4,117  | 312   | 216   | 77,625    |
| Arauco      | 2,672   | 3,940   | 921    | 23    | 19    | 7,575     |
| Bío-Bío     | 8,478   | 4,151   | 1,393  | 41    | 43    | 14,106    |
| Malleco     | 11,002  | 4,943   | 1,362  | 75    | 30    | 17,412    |
| Cautín      | 26,019  | 9,631   | 2,571  | 124   | 60    | 38,405    |
| Valdivia    | 15,047  | 9,456   | 1,515  | 124   | 58    | 26,200    |
| Osorno      | 9,093   | 4,438   | 1,675  | 84    | 34    | 15,324    |
| Llanquihue  | 10,303  | 3,654   | 1,156  | 51    | 30    | 15,194    |
| Aysén       | 2,263   | 1,073   | 256    | 28    | 9     | 3,629     |
| Chiloé      | 5,765   | 2,994   | 1,276  | 111   | 45    | 10,191    |
| Magallanes  | 7,009   | 6,157   | 1,137  | 41    | 31    | 14,375    |
| TOTALS      | 756,117 | 384,132 | 57,162 | 4,678 | 2,664 | 1,204,753 |

## V

1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION DATA FOR  
FOUR MOST POPULOUS PROVINCESTable

- |    |                                                                                                                                               |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 14 | Map Showing Location of Four Most Populous Chilean Provinces                                                                                  |
| 15 | Percentage of National 1964 Estimated Population, Estimated Electorate, and Presidential Vote in the Four Most Populous Provinces             |
| 16 | Voting Participation in the 1964 Presidential Election for the Four Most Populous Provinces Compared with Population and Estimated Electorate |
| 17 | Percentage Distribution Among Candidates of 1964 Total Valid Vote in the Four Most Populous Provinces                                         |



TABLE 14  
MAP SHOWING LOCATION OF FOUR  
MOST POPULOUS CHILEAN PROVINCES




TABLE 15

PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL 1964 ESTIMATED POPULATION, ESTIMATED ELECTORATE,  
AND PRESIDENTIAL VOTE IN THE FOUR MOST POPULOUS PROVINCES

| Province   | Percentage of<br>Total Population <sup>a</sup> | Percentage of Estimated<br>1964 Electorate <sup>b</sup> | Percentage of<br>Total Vote |
|------------|------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Valparaíso | 8.34                                           | 9.69                                                    | 10.60                       |
| Santiago   | 34.25                                          | 38.32                                                   | 40.50                       |
| Concepción | 7.45                                           | 7.44                                                    | 6.64                        |
| Cautín     | 5.09                                           | 4.43                                                    | 3.83                        |
| TOTAL      | 55.13                                          | 59.88                                                   | 61.57                       |

TABLE 16

VOTING PARTICIPATION IN THE 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION  
FOR THE FOUR MOST POPULOUS PROVINCES COMPARED  
WITH POPULATION AND ESTIMATED ELECTORATE

| Province   | Estimated Population<br>September, 1964 <sup>a</sup> | Estimated 1964<br>Electorate <sup>b</sup> | 1964<br>Vote |
|------------|------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------|
| Valparaíso | 663,715                                              | 339,490                                   | 268,208      |
| Santiago   | 2,724,244                                            | 1,342,130                                 | 1,024,897    |
| Concepción | 592,836                                              | 260,587                                   | 168,220      |
| Cautín     | 405,236                                              | 155,157                                   | 96,974       |
| TOTAL      | 4,386,031                                            | 2,097,364                                 | 1,558,299    |

<sup>a</sup>Using 1952 and 1960 censuses, a population rate of growth was estimated for each province and extrapolated to September, 1964, the month of the election.

<sup>b</sup>Estimates of literates 21 and over in September, 1964.

TABLE 17

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION AMONG CANDIDATES OF 1964 TOTAL  
VALID VOTE IN THE FOUR MOST POPULOUS PROVINCES\*

| Province   | Frei  | Allende | Durán |
|------------|-------|---------|-------|
| Valparaíso | 60.27 | 36.09   | 3.64  |
| Santiago   | 60.89 | 35.70   | 3.41  |
| Concepción | 45.18 | 49.32   | 5.50  |
| Cautín     | 62.98 | 31.16   | 5.86  |
| TOTAL      | 59.22 | 36.96   | 3.83  |

\*Percentages are as calculated, and are not rounded out to equal 100%.



## VI

## 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION DATA FOR EIGHT REGIONS

Table

- |    |                                                                                    |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 18 | Map of the Eight Regions of Chile                                                  |
| 19 | Distribution of Estimated 1964 Chilean Population by Region                        |
| 20 | Distribution of 1964 Presidential Vote by Region                                   |
| 21 | Distribution of 1964 Male Presidential Vote by Region                              |
| 22 | Distribution of 1964 Female Presidential Vote by Region                            |
| 23 | Gross Distribution of 1964 Valid Presidential Vote Among Candidates by Region      |
| 24 | Percentage Distribution of 1964 Valid Presidential Vote Among Candidates by Region |

TABLE 18  
MAP OF THE EIGHT REGIONS OF CHILE



TABLE 19

## DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED 1964 CHILEAN POPULATION BY REGION

| Region        | Estimated 1964<br>Population <sup>a</sup> | Percentage of<br>Total Population |
|---------------|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Great North   | 358,220                                   | 4.50                              |
| Little North  | 454,906                                   | 5.72                              |
| Central Urban | 3,532,877                                 | 44.42                             |
| North Central | 774,542                                   | 9.74                              |
| South Central | 562,178                                   | 7.07                              |
| The Frontier  | 1,455,214                                 | 18.29                             |
| The Lakes     | 595,308                                   | 7.48                              |
| The Canals    | 220,439                                   | 2.77                              |
| TOTAL         | 7,954,066 <sup>b</sup>                    | 99.99 <sup>c</sup>                |

<sup>a</sup>Using 1952 and 1960 censuses, a population rate of growth was estimated for each province and extrapolated to September, 1964, the month of the election.

<sup>b</sup>Total includes the Territorio Antartica (Antarctic Territory) of Chile.

<sup>c</sup>Percentages are as calculated, and are not rounded out to equal 100%.

TABLE 20

## DISTRIBUTION OF 1964 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE BY REGION

| Region        | Votes     | Percentage of<br>Total Vote |
|---------------|-----------|-----------------------------|
| Great North   | 136,001   | 5.37                        |
| Little North  | 125,076   | 4.94                        |
| Central Urban | 1,341,085 | 52.99                       |
| North Central | 211,771   | 8.37                        |
| South Central | 139,065   | 5.50                        |
| The Frontier  | 367,123   | 14.51                       |
| The Lakes     | 245,574   | 5.75                        |
| The Canals    | 65,002    | 2.57                        |
| TOTAL         | 2,530,697 | 100.00                      |



TABLE 21

## DISTRIBUTION OF 1964 MALE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE BY REGION

| Region        | Male Vote | Percentage of<br>Total Male Vote |
|---------------|-----------|----------------------------------|
| Great North   | 75,612    | 5.70                             |
| Little North  | 70,333    | 5.30                             |
| Central Urban | 651,583   | 49.14                            |
| North Central | 114,119   | 8.61                             |
| South Central | 76,634    | 5.78                             |
| The Frontier  | 212,000   | 15.99                            |
| The Lakes     | 88,856    | 6.70                             |
| The Canals    | 36,807    | 2.78                             |
| TOTAL         | 1,325,944 | 100.00                           |

TABLE 22

## DISTRIBUTION OF 1964 FEMALE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE BY REGION

| Region        | Female Vote | Percentage of<br>Total Female Vote |
|---------------|-------------|------------------------------------|
| Great North   | 60,389      | 5.01                               |
| Little North  | 54,743      | 4.54                               |
| Central Urban | 689,502     | 57.23                              |
| North Central | 97,652      | 8.11                               |
| South Central | 62,431      | 5.18                               |
| The Frontier  | 155,123     | 12.86                              |
| The Lakes     | 56,718      | 4.71                               |
| The Canals    | 28,195      | 2.34                               |
| TOTAL         | 1,204,753   | 99.98*                             |

\*

Percentages are as calculated, and are not rounded out to equal 100%.

TABLE 23

GROSS DISTRIBUTION OF 1964 VALID PRESIDENTIAL VOTE  
AMONG CANDIDATES BY REGION

| Region        | Frei      | Allende | Durán   |
|---------------|-----------|---------|---------|
| Great North   | 61,745    | 64,413  | 8,477   |
| Little North  | 55,802    | 55,712  | 12,403  |
| Central Urban | 807,183   | 479,204 | 46,619  |
| North Central | 110,921   | 90,727  | 8,652   |
| South Central | 77,553    | 51,489  | 8,983   |
| The Frontier  | 185,788   | 154,725 | 23,500  |
| The Lakes     | 78,869    | 54,921  | 10,229  |
| The Canals    | 31,151    | 26,711  | 6,370   |
| TOTALS        | 1,409,012 | 977,902 | 125,233 |

TABLE 24

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF 1964 VALID PRESIDENTIAL VOTE  
AMONG CANDIDATES BY REGION

| Region        | Frei  | Allende | Durán |
|---------------|-------|---------|-------|
| Great North   | 45.86 | 47.84   | 6.30  |
| Little North  | 45.03 | 44.96   | 10.01 |
| Central Urban | 60.55 | 35.95   | 3.50  |
| North Central | 52.74 | 43.14   | 4.11  |
| South Central | 56.19 | 37.30   | 6.51  |
| The Frontier  | 51.04 | 42.51   | 6.46  |
| The Lakes     | 54.76 | 38.13   | 7.10  |
| The Canals    | 48.50 | 41.59   | 9.92  |
| TOTALS        | 56.09 | 38.93   | 4.99* |

\*Percentages are calculated, and are not rounded out to equal 100%.

## VII

## 1952 AND 1958 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS

Table

- |    |                                                                                                          |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 25 | 1952 Presidential Election Results                                                                       |
|    | A. Gross and Percentage Distribution of Valid Vote<br>Among Presidential Candidates in 1952 Elections    |
|    | B. Percentage Distribution of Valid Male Vote Among<br>Presidential Candidates in 1952 Election          |
|    | C. Percentage Distribution of Valid Female Vote<br>Among Presidential Candidates in 1952 Election        |
| 26 | 1958 Presidential Election Results                                                                       |
|    | A. Gross and Percentage Distribution of Valid Vote<br>Among Presidential Candidates in the 1958 Election |
|    | B. Percentage Distribution of Male Valid Vote Among<br>Presidential Candidates in 1958 Election          |
|    | C. Percentage Distribution of Female Valid Vote Among<br>Presidential Candidates in 1958 Election        |



TABLE 25

## 1952 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS

25-A

Gross and Percentage Distribution of Valid Vote Among  
Presidential Candidates in 1952 Election

| Candidate        | Vote Received | Percentage of Total<br>Valid Vote |
|------------------|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| Carlos Ibáñez    | 446,439       | 46.8                              |
| Arturo Matte     | 265,357       | 27.8                              |
| Pedro Alfonso    | 190,360       | 19.9                              |
| Salvador Allende | 51,975        | 5.5                               |

## 25-B

Percentage Distribution of Valid Male Vote Among  
Presidential Candidates in 1952 Election

| Candidate | Percentage of<br>Male Vote |
|-----------|----------------------------|
| Ibáñez    | 48.4                       |
| Matte     | 26.0                       |
| Alfonso   | 19.8                       |
| Allende   | 5.8                        |

## 25-C

Percentage Distribution of Valid Female Vote Among  
Presidential Candidates in 1952 Election

| Candidate | Percentage of<br>Female Vote |
|-----------|------------------------------|
| Ibáñez    | 43.0                         |
| Matte     | 32.0                         |
| Alfonso   | 20.2                         |
| Allende   | 4.6                          |

TABLE 26

## 1958 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS

26-A

Gross and Percentage Distribution of Valid Vote Among  
Presidential Candidates in 1958 Election

| Candidate        | Vote Received | Percentage of Total<br>Valid Vote |
|------------------|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| Jorge Alessandri | 389,909       | 31.6                              |
| Salvador Allende | 356,493       | 28.9                              |
| Eduardo Frei     | 255,769       | 20.7                              |
| Luis Bossay      | 192,077       | 15.6                              |
| Antonio Zamorano | 41,304        | 3.3                               |



## 26-B

Percentage Distribution of Male Valid Vote Among  
Presidential Candidates in 1958 Election

| Candidate   | Percentage of<br>Male Vote |
|-------------|----------------------------|
| Allessandri | 30.2                       |
| Allende     | 32.4                       |
| Frei        | 19.0                       |
| Bossay      | 15.2                       |
| Zamorano    | 3.2                        |

## 26-C

Percentage Distribution of Female Valid Vote Among  
Presidential Candidates in 1958 Election

| Candidate   | Percentage of<br>Female Vote |
|-------------|------------------------------|
| Allessandri | 34.1                         |
| Allende     | 22.3                         |
| Frei        | 23.9                         |
| Bossay      | 16.1                         |
| Zamorano    | 3.6                          |







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